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Finding effective decision-making techniques for scientific disputes
has been one of the most elusive problems for the administrative process.' Many scientists and others have supported the idea of a "science
court"-a panel to which administrative agencies can refer scientific disputes for resolution by experts. 2 In response, the Food and Drug Administration has developed a unique procedural mechanism, the Public
Board of Inquiry (PBOI), to address such questions. The PBOI consists
of a panel of three scientists and performs the role of an administrative
law judge in the agency's hearing process. Hearings before the PBOI
resemble a "scientific seminar"-most of the traditional hearing proce3
dures are eliminated, including the direct participation of lawyers.
FDA has held two PBOI proceedings. In 1980, a PBOI was convened to determine whether aspartame, a widely used artificial sweetener
sold under the brand name NutraSweet, should be licensed as a food
additive. 4 In 1983, a PBOI was convened to determine whether depo1. See Carrow & Nyhart, Introduction, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION: REsOLVING REGULATORY ISSUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (M. Carrow & J. Nyhart eds. 1983)
[hereinafter LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION].
2. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 21-23, 76-78 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 133-93 and accompanying text.
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provera, a new drug approved as a contraceptive in practically every
country except the United States, should be licensed for that use.5 This
article examines the PBOI procedure to assess its usefulness.
I.

SCIENTIFIC DISPUTES AND THE FUNCTION
OF HEARING PROCEDURES

A.

The Nature of the PBOI Procedures.

The federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)6 requires the
FDA to hold a "formal evidentiary hearing" to resolve any controversy
concerning the approval of food additives and new drugs. 7 This hearing
constitutes formal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure
Act.8 Since 1976, the FDA has offered parties entitled to a formal evidentiary hearing the alternative of choosing one of three informal methods for resolving their disputes: a hearing before a PBOI, 9 a hearing
before an advisory committee, 10 or a hearing before the commissioner of
the FDA. 1
The commissioner will grant such a party's request for a PBOI
when "it is in the public interest."' 12 Any person may become a participant in the PBOI by filing a notice of intent.' 3 The commissioner then
selects three scientists from persons the participants nominate to serve as
a three-member hearing board; 14 he must choose one member from
nominations submitted by the FDA staff or from those submitted by the
party that sought the PBOI,' 5 and a second from the nominations submitted by the other participants in the hearing.' 6 The commissioner may
appoint any qualified person to serve as the third member and chairperson.' 7 All members of the board must have "medical, technical, scientific, or other qualifications relevant to the issues to be considered." 18
5. See infra notes 194-240 and accompanying text.
6. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).

7. Id. § 348(f); id. § 355(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1984).
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982); see R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.2 (1985).
9. 21 C.F.R. §§ 13.1-.50 (1985).
10. Id. §§ 14.1-.174.
11. Id. §§ 15.1-.45.
12. Id. § 13.1(a). The PBOI process starts with a hearing notice published in the Federal Reg-

ister. Id. § 13.5.
13. Id. § 13.5(a)(2).
14. Id. § 13.10.
15. Id. § 13.10(c).
16. Id.
17. Id. Participants in the PBOI may also agree to an alternative method of selecting the
board. Id. § 13.10(d).
18. Id. § 13.10(a).
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A PBOI decision has the same legal status as the "initial decision"
of an ALJ. 19 Further, both the requirement of separation of functions
and the prohibition against ex parte contacts apply to the PBOI.20 Nevertheless, the FDA requires that "proceedings of a Board [be] conducted
as a scientific inquiry rather than a legal trial. ' 21 Thus participants may
make uninterrupted oral presentations, and only the panel may question
the witnesses, 22 although participants may comment briefly on the
presentations and may suggest questions to the board. 23 The board may
also ask FDA-paid consultants of its choice to present data at the hearing. 24 At the conclusion of the hearing, participants may submit written
25
statements of their positions with proposed findings and conclusions.
The PBOI procedure involves a substantial departure from a conventional hearing 26 -the roles of lawyers and of the advocacy process are
minimized in favor of a "scientific forum." Evaluating this deemphasis
of adversary techniques requires consideration of the nature of scientific
evidence, hearing procedures, and scientific input.
B.

The Nature of Scientific Evidence.

Health and safety regulatory agencies are required to determine
whether chemicals are sufficiently "safe" for human exposure or consumption. The FDA, for example, determines whether food and color
28
additives are "safe" 27 and whether drugs are "safe" and "effective.
The Environmental Protection Agency,2 9 the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, 30 and the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) 3 1 make analogous scientific assessments. In determining the
safety of chemicals, these agencies consider three sources of scientific evi19. Id. § 12.32(f)(1). The Board acts as an FDA consultant and is not subject to the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. Id. § 13.10(e).

20. Id. § 13.15.
21. Id. § 13.30(a).

22. Id. § 13.30(c).
23. Id.

24. Id. § 13.30(f).
25. Id. § 13.30(e),(i).
26. Because they are similar to a PBOI, hearings before advisory committees and the commissioner are also significant departures from a conventional hearing. See id. §§ 14.1-.55, 15.1-.45.
27. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c), 376(a) (1982).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (Supp. 111984).
29. The EPA monitors the safety of pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982).
30. OSHA monitors the safety of exposure to chemicals in the workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 655
(1982).
31. The CPSC monitors potentially hazardous products marketed to the general public. 15
U.S.C. § 1262 (1982).
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dence: 32 experiments conducted to evaluate the effect on experimental
animals; 33 clinical experiments performed upon humans; 3 4 and epidemiological studies evaluating the effect of prolonged exposure.3 5
To evaluate this type of scientific evidence, the agency must perform
three assessments: data determination, data interpretation, and data extrapolation. 36 The first involves determining the results of the experiments or studies. The second involves ascertaining the scientific
significance of those results, which requires the agency to assess whether
the methodology used in the studies was scientifically valid. In the third
step, the agency predicts the consequences of human exposure to the
chemical based on the results of studies considered to be valid.
The agency's determinations at each of these stages range from the
purely factual-those that are capable of objective determination-to
matters of judgment-those on which reasonable persons can disagree.
Such "judgmental" conclusions can be "scientific"-requiring the application of scientific knowledge and experience-or "regulatory," requir37
ing the application of legal or policymaking knowledge and experience.
The degree to which a conclusion is factual or judgmental, and the na-

ture of the judgment as scientific or regulatory, will differ depending on
the source of the scientific evidence.

1. Animal and ClinicalData. In animal experimentation, investigators compare the health of animals in a "test" group with that of animals in a "control" group. Only the test group is administered the
chemical being studied, but the experimenters select and maintain the
32. See McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency DisclosurePolicies, 93 HARV. L. REv. 837, 868, n.157 (1980) (animal and
human evidence used by FDA); Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to OccupationalDisease: The Role
of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1232-36 (1984) (animal and epidemiological evidence used by OSHA); Shapiro, Divorcing ProfitMotivationfrom New Drug Research: A
Considerationof Proposalsto Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DuKE L.J. 155, 157-58
(animal and human evidence used by FDA) [hereinafter Divorcing ProfitMotivation]; Shapiro, Limiting PhysicianFreedom to Prescribea DrugforAny Purpose: The Need for FDA Regulation, 73 Nw.
U.L. REV. 801, 803 (1978) (animal and human evidence used by FDA) [hereinafter Limiting Physician Freedom].
33. See Divorcing Profit Motivation, supra note 32, at 157-59; Limiting Physician Freedom,
supra note 32, at 803.
34. See Divorcing Profit Motivation, supra note 32, at 157-61; Limiting Physician Freedom,
supra note 32, at 803.
35. See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1233-36.
36. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
37. See McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogensin EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729, 731-49 (1979)
(discussing the nature of science policy questions in relation to attempts to regulate consumer and
worker exposure to chemical carcinogens).
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animals under otherwise identical conditions. 38 The aim is to determine
whether the animals in the test group develop any health consequences

not shared by animals in the control group. Human experimentation is
39
conducted on the same basis.
Assessing the results of the experiment-"data determination"-is
normally a purely factual matter, and although the agency must ascertain the absence of scientific fraud4° the process does not normally in-

volve any scientific judgment. Even data determination, however, can
occasionally involve scientific judgment. Pathologists, for example, may

interpret tissue samples of animal tumors differently; one pathologist
may consider a particular tumor to be malignant, while another may
41
reach the contrary conclusion.
To interpret the results, an agency assesses the statistical and biological significance of the results. An event is statistically significant when it

is probable that it was not the result of chance. 42 An event is biologically
significant when the scientific evidence suggests a causal relationship be-

tween the administration of the chemical and the different health result
43
in the test group.

Both assessments involve elements of judgment. Some statistical determinations are purely factual, but others involve both scientific and
regulatory judgments. For example, there must be a regulatory judg-

ment as to what events are statistically significant. 44 Biological significance involves scientific judgment because the evaluation of a specific

study requires scientific training and experience. 45

38. See Chemical Carcinogens; A Review of the Science and Its Associated Principles, 50 Fed.
Reg. 10,372, 10,412 (1985) [hereinafter Chemical Carcinogens]; Cooper, Saccharin-Of Risk and
Democracy, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 34, 51 (1985).
39. See Cooper, supra note 38, at 51.
40. See Divorcing Profit Motivation, supra note 32, at 165-68.
41. See McGarity, supra note 37, at 740.
42. See Cyclamate (Cylamic Acid, Calcium Cyclamate, and Sodium Cyclamate), Commissioner's Decision, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,474, 61,478 (1980) (FDA Commissioner's decision on cyclamates)
[hereinafter Cyclamate Decision].
43. Relevant factors include whether there was a dose-response relationship; the incidence of
tumors (or other manifestations) in the test group; whether there are similar results in other comparable studies; the incidence of tumors (or other manifestations) in the test group as compared to the
control group; whether there was an acceleration of the onset of the manifestation; and the size of
the study. Id. at 61,478.
44. See id. at 61,478-81.
45. "'Biological significance' . . . involves consideration of biological factors," including study
methodology, dose-response relationship, comparison to other studies, and determinations of a tumor's rarity. Cyclamate Decision, supra note 42, at 61,478; see also Merrill, Federal Regulations of
Cancer-Causing Chemicals, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982 REcOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 21, 69-74 (1982). All of these considerations naturally require scientific expertise.
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In "data extrapolation," an agency attempts to relate the experimental results to the probable effect of the chemical on people. If the chemical has been tested in humans, the agency considers the degree of
similarity between the test conditions and the conditions under which
human exposure occurs. 4 6 If, as is often the case, the chemical has not
been tested in humans, 4 7 the agency determines how to use the results of
animal experimentation to predict the consequences of human contact
with the chemical. Such data extrapolation is made particularly difficult
where the extent to which the experimental animals are exposed to the
chemical differs from the extent to which humans are likely to be exposed, 48 and where differences between human and animal physiology
49
may lead to different reactions to the chemical.
Data extrapolation involves both scientific and regulatory judgments. For example, determining whether the results of an animal experiment can be applied to humans necessarily requires scientific expertise.
In contrast, determination of whether a chemical is "safe" requires an
agency to interpret its statutory mission-an exercise of regulatory judgment. The FDA, for instance, must apply the requirements of the Delaney Amendment, which prohibits the use of any food additive that is
carcinogenic in animals or humans.5 0 The agency's interpretation of the
Delaney Amendment provides for several exceptions to this prohibition,
and each exception raises a policy issue concerning how much risk
should be accepted from an animal carcinogen knowingly added to the
1
food supply. 5
2. EpidemiologicalData. In epidemiological research, investigators compare the prevalence of a disease in a group of persons who were
exposed to a chemical to the prevalence of the same disease in a similar
group of nonexposed persons. The greater the comparative occurrence
of the disease in the first group, the more likely it is that exposure to the
46. See Merrill, supra note 45, at 50.
47. See Divorcing ProfitMotivation, supra note 32, at 158-61; see also Cooper, supra note 38, at
50; McGarity, supra note 37, at 743.
48. The problem is that the only practical test method for animal experimentation is to administer large doses of a chemical to the animals. For human safety determinations, however, the regulator must decide whether the chemical causes adverse effects at lower doses of consumption or
contact. Therefore the agency must estimate the extent of human contact and whether that amount
is above or below the level at which contact is safe. See Cooper, supra note 38, at 55-59; see also
Chemical Carcinogens, supra note 38, at 10,414-17 (1985).

49. See, eg., Chemical Carcinogens, supra note 38, at 10,416; see also Cooper, supra note 38, at
54.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982); see also id. § 376(b)(5)(B) (Delaney clause for color addi.

tives); id. § 360(d)(1)(-) (Delaney clause for animal drugs).
51. Cooper, Stretching Delaney Till It Breaks, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 11. Other

health and safety agencies must make similar judgments. See McGarity, supra note 37, at 743-47.
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chemical caused the disease.52
Agencies employ the same three phases of evaluation to assess this
type of data. After the test results are determined, an agency must determine whether the difference between the prevalence of the disease in the
test and control groups is statistically significant, and whether the study's
methodology is reliable. 53 Finally, it is often necessary to extrapolate the
data. Because of the costs of acquiring health data about persons in a
test group, epidemiologists limit the number of persons studied.5 4 An
agency must therefore assess how the limited size of a study affects its
validity 55 and whether the results of the study are valid for persons ex56
posed to the chemical under different circumstances.
C.

The Nature of Hearing Procedures.

As hearing procedures have changed in the last few years, particularly at health and safety agencies, agencies have become increasingly
dependent on "hybrid rulemaking. ' 57 The FDA introduced another significant change in its use of the PBOI in place of an adversarial hearing.
Both changes reflect the fact that some questions of data interpretation
and extrapolation are regulatory judgments, while others require scien58
tific judgments.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies generally utilize
either adjudication-analogous to a bench trial, complete with an independent judge (an ALJ) and an oral presentation of evidence subject to
cross-examination 59-- or informal rulemaking-which involves only an
informal hearing process. 60 The APA's dichotomy reflects Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis's division of facts into two categories: "adjudicative
facts" and "legislative facts." In Davis's categorization, adjudicative
facts answer "the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why,
with what motives or intent"; legislative facts "are general facts which
52. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1233.
53. See, e.g., Cyclamate Decision, supra note 42, at 61,478. The FDA requires that all studies
follow its regulations, found at 21 C.F.R. § 58 (1985).
54. Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1233-36.
55. See Merrill, supra note 45, at 56-57; see also Cooper, supra note 38, at 53.
56. See Merrill, supra note 45, at 69-71.
57. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
59. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1982); see generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra
note 8, §§ 6.4.3-.3d.
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); see generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note
8, at §§ 6.4.6-.66. The agency is not required to use an ALU or to provide an opportunity for oral
testimony and cross-examination. It can act through the far less formal sequence of issuing notice of
its intent to act, providing an opportunity for individuals and groups to comment in writing, and
accompanying its final action with a statement of basis and purpose.
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help the tribunal decide questions of law, policy, and discretion.

'6 1

The framers of the APA envisioned that formal hearings would be
reserved for matters in which disputes concerning "adjudicative facts"
were prominent. 62 They assumed that resolving such disputes required
highly developed advocacy procedures, 63 separation of functions, 64 and a
prohibition against ex parte contacts. 65 In contrast, they chose informal
rulemaking for the production of regulations because they assumed that

the resolution of disputes concerning "legislative facts" did not require a
highly developed advocacy process. 6 6 Further, they considered informal

rulemaking preferable for the promulgation of rules because it was more

67
efficient and allowed all interested parties to participate.
Since the 1960's, agencies have deemphasized the use of formal
hearings and informal rulemaking. Agencies have adopted summary
61. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing,70 HARV. L. REV. 193, 199 (1956).

62.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON AD-

43 (1941) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
63. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1982) (adjudication procedures); see generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 5.01 (1959) (distinguishing rulemaking and adjudicatory functions); FINAL
REPORT, supra note 62, at 43. In a formal hearing, accuracy is enhanced by the structured, incremental presentation of evidence, the right to address and rebut evidence, and the relatively unlimited
right to cross-examination. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Curefor Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J.
1, 18-19 (1982) (discussing benefits of the adversarial procedures); see also Hamilton, Rulemaking on
a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1132, 1155 (1972) (noting that
hearing provides industry the opportunity to point out agency's erroneous factual assumptions);
Kennedy, The New Vogue in Rulemaking at FDA: A Foreword, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 172, 174
(1973) (discussing arguments in favor of and opposed to trial-type rulemaking procedures); Mashaw,
The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of
Accuracy, Fairness,and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 772, 776-79 (1974) (discussing limitations of trial-type hearings in ensuring fairness and accuracy). It is also promoted by the presence of an ALl trained in the rules of evidence and procedure.
See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (1982).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1982) (employee who presides at hearing must not be responsible to
or subject to supervision of employee engaged in investigative or prosecutorial functions of the
agency); see generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 6.4.3.
65. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1982); see generally ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 161-62 (1983) (noting that ex
parte communications increase the likelihood that "crucial information influencing the agency decision will not be available to the reviewing court") [hereinafter ACUS GUIDE]; DeLong, Informal
Rulemaking and the Integrationof Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 305 (1979) (prohibition of
ex parte contacts protects right of interested parties to participate and the integrity of the decision
process).
66. Davis, supra note 61, at 214-18.
67. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development ofAdministrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 930-33 (1965) (informal rulemaking procedures allow greater
opportunities for both general participation and agency planning and thus better allocation of limited resources than is possible in formal adjudication); see also Hutt, Philosophyof Regulation Under
theFederalFood,Drugand CosmeticAct, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177, 183 (1973) (rulemaking is
the "most effective and efficient means by which industry-wide regulation can be achieved").
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
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judgment mechanisms to avoid formal hearings, 68 and have promulgated
generic rules to remove certain issues from the litigation. 69 Because
health and safety disputes are dominated by questions of scientific and

regulatory judgment-matters that do not involve typical adjudicatory
fact questions because they are incapable of objective determination 7°agencies have deemphasized formal hearings in these areas as well. 71 At
the same time, informal rulemaking has been changed in those health
and safety agencies that are required to use hybrid rulemaking procedures 72-procedures in addition to those the APA expressly requires for
informal rulemaking. The additional procedures usually require the

agency to hold a hearing before promulgating a regulation, 73 but do not
include all procedures required in formal hearings. For example, even if
the hybrid procedure requires an agency to hold a hearing, parties may
not have the right to cross-examine witnesses, or if cross-examination is
74
allowed, it may be limited to certain circumstances or purposes.
Hybrid procedures are useful in resolving certain types of scientific
disputes. Some scientific disputes require a "general scientific judgment," which assesses the role and significance of scientific evidence in
the regulatory process generally. For example, general scientific judg68. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 12.93 (1985) (FDA's summary judgment rule); 10 C.F.R. § 2.749 (1985)
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission's summary judgment rule); see McGarity, supranote 37, at 761-62
(discussing EPA's proposed summary judgment rule); see also Ames & McCracken, FramingRegulatoryStandardsto Avoid FormalAdjudication: The FDA as a Case Study, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 14, 1649 (1976) (discussing FDA's use of summary judgment); McGarity, supra note 37, at 759-66 (discussing FDA and EPA summary judgment procedures).
69. See McGarity, supra note 37, at 754-59 (discussing OSHA's generic rulemaking procedures); see generally Robinson, The Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. Rv. 485, 490-535 (1970)
(discussing FTC, FCC, CAB, and NLRB rulemaking); Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking to
Resolve Environmental Issues in Nuclear Power PlantLicensing, 61 VA. L. REV. 869, 879-86 (1975)
(discussing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's efficient, but ad hoe, use of generic rulemaking for
licensing nuclear power plants).
70. See Hamilton, supra note 63, at 1156 (noting that an expert witness "is unlikely to be
shaken by cross-examination that requires comment on other statements by the same or different
expert witnesses"); Harter, supra note 63, at 19-22 (discussing disadvantages inherent in adversarial
process); McGarity, supra note 37, at 732 ("[A]gencies have been forced to resolve scientific questions ... partially on policy grounds ....
[Flormal procedures are generally inappropriate for
resolving these issues .. "); see also Note, FDA Rule-Making Hearings:A Way Out of the Peanut
Butter Quagmire, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 726, 731-38 (1972) (discussing disadvantages of trial-type
hearings).
71. See supra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1982)
(Clean Air Act); see generally Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption ofRules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276
(1972); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CH1. L. REV. 401 (1975).
73. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 6.4.9.
74. See infra note 80.
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ments are necessary to determine whether animal studies can be considered generally reliable to predict health effects in humans. These matters

arguably are suitable for informal rulemaking because of their "legislative" nature. 75 Other disputes require "specific scientific judgment,"
which assesses the relevance of particular data-determining, for exam76
ple, whether the methodology of a particular animal study is reliable.
Questions of "specific scientific judgment" do not involve legislative

facts, because they call for expert evaluation of particular and specific

data. 77 Congress has found that informal rulemaking's limited advocacy
process fails to expose the evidentiary inferences that experts use in de78
riving specific scientific judgments.
Despite some trend toward use of hybrid rulemaking, there is no
consensus concerning what additional procedures should be used. Hybrid procedures vary considerably, for example, in the type of notice re-

quired 79 and the extent of cross-examination allowed. 80 The greatest
lack of consensus concerns the usefulness of cross-examination for health
81
and safety matters.

75. See McGarity, supra note 37, at 732, 736-40.
76. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
77. See McGarity, supra note 37, at 741-42.
78. See Hamilton, supra note 63, at 1155 (one justification for formal procedures is that they
give objecting party an opportunity to show that agency's factual assumptions are erroneous); see
also Hagan, Remarks on the Regulatory Philosophyof FDA, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 195, 198-99
(1973) (scientific factual disputes are best resolved in trial-type proceedings with cross-examination).
But see Hoffman, The FDA's New Forms of PublicHearing-ChoosingAmong the Alternatives, 32
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 330, 333-35 (1977) (one disadvantage of the formal hearing is that the
administrative law judge is at best a generalist in science); Hutt, supra note 67, at 187-88 (scientific
and technical issues are not well-suited to trial-type procedures); Yellin, High Technology and the
Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for InstitutionalReform, 94 HARV. L. REV. 489, 549 (1981)
(adversary process does not provide "a useful framework for improving the scientific underpinnings
of administrative decisions").
79. Most hybrid rulemaking schemes use the APA notice provisions, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982),
but others require an expanded form of notice. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (1982) (Clean Air
Act).
80. Compare Boyer, Executive Summary of Barry B. Boyer Report. Trade Regulation
Rulemaking Proceduresof the Federal Trade Commission, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 41, 68 (1979) (use of cross-examination
in hybrid FTC rulemaking) with Williams, supra note 72, at 434-35 (cross-examination used only as
last resort in EPA Clean Air Act rulemaking). See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative
Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 308-09 (1978) (comparison of how OSHA, EPA and FTC
control cross-examination).
81. Compare Hutt, Impact of Recent Court Decisions on the Future of FDA Regulations: An
Impromptu Response to the Remarks of the Speakers, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 707, 714-15 (1973)
(most important consideration is not cross-examination, but full participation); Kestenbaum,
Rulemaking Beyond APA: Criteriafor Trial-Type Proceduresand the FTC Improvement Act, 44
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 679, 702 (1976) (cross-examination should be procedure of last resort); and
Williams, supra note 72, at 436-55 (paper exchanges superior to cross-examination to expose faulty
assumptions and methodologies) with Anderson, An Overview of Recent Regulatory Developments-
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The Nature of Scientific Participation.

The use of the PBOI is consistent with these trends in two respects.
First, use of the PBOI obviates the need for a formal evidentiary hearing. 82 The movement away from formal hearings reflects the general be-

lief that they are too cumbersome and relatively useless for the resolution
of most scientific disputes. 83 Second, the PBOI is a "hybrid" proceeding
that involves procedures beyond those the APA requires for informal
84
rulemaking.
Yet the PBOI diverges from these trends insofar as they maintain
the traditional reliance on advocacy procedures to evaluate specific scientific judgments.85 The PBOI rejects that approach in favor of a "scien-

tific seminar" in which decisions are made by scientists, instead of an
ALJ, and the use of adversarial procedures is greatly limited.8 6 Because
this aspect of the PBOI is unique, 87 it is important to consider the func-

tions and methods of scientific input.
1. The Rationalefor Scientific Participation. The idea that scientists should be employed in resolving regulatory controversies originated
with proposals for a "science court." The first such proposal, advanced
by Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz, advocated the use of a body composed of
scientific experts to assist agencies in resolving the scientific aspects of
regulatory issues. 88 Proponents argued that scientists are better qualified
The Casefor EvidentiaryHearings, 31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 159, 165 (1976) (elimination of crossexamination will have a "generally negative effect on the factual integrity of any Agency action");
Dixon, Rulemaking and the Myth of Cross-examination, 34 AD. L. REv. 389, 435-43 (1982) (crossexamination is a necessary procedural safeguard); and Robinson, supra note 69, at 522-23 (crossexamination effectively exposes error and bias). See also Boyer, supra note 80, at 63-64 (FTC attempts to control cross-examination failed).
82. The PBOI proceeding replaces a formal evidentiary hearing. See supra notes 9-18 and
accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 84. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (APA informal rulemaking) with 21 C.F.R. §§ 13.1-.50
(1985) (PBOI procedures).
85. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
88. Kantrowitz, Proposalfor an Institutionfor Scientific Judgment, 156 SCIENCE 763, 763-64
(1967). For other proposals, see Comparative Risk Assessment: Hearings on H.R. 4939 Before the
Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 279, 281 (1980) (American Industrial Health Council proposal for a science
panel); B. ACKERMAN, S. ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 156 (1974) (proposal for a technical review board); Ramo, The
Regulation of TechnologicalActivities:A New Approach, 67 A.B.A. J. 1456, 1461-62 (1980) (proposal
for a "technological FBI"); see also Kleinfeld, A Court of Food and Drug Appeals, 26 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 279, 283-84 (1971) (proposal for specialized federal court to hear appeals from FDA
decisions).
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than laymen to understand complex scientific evidence, to distinguish between scientific and policy or value judgments, and to explain their decisions in a credible manner.8 9 Opponents found the idea impractical,
arguing that few regilatory controversies concerned disputes about
purely scientific matters, that those that did could be handled adequately
by existing procedures, and that the proposal involved adversarial procedures that either were ill-suited to resolve scientific disputes or would not
cure the shortcomings of existing factfinding mechanisms. 90

Although interest in the "science court" proposal waned, scholars
continued to explore ways to use scientific expertise. In the 1970's, Judge

Harold Leventhal suggested that courts should use science-trained law
clerks to assist in the decision of cases involving scientific and technological information. 91 Recently, Professor Joel Yellin has proposed that a
committee of scientists and other experts be available for appointment by
federal appellate judges as special masters in cases involving complex sci-

entific issues. 92 Like the PBOI, the special masters would assist the ultimate decisionmaker-in this case, an appellate court-by making
89. See Kantrowitz, supra note 88, at 764 n.1 ("IT]he essential information which the political
community requires from the scientific community is a considered and unbiased statement of the
currently available scientific facts."); Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MIcH. L. REV.
1058, 1059 (1977) (among main reasons for establishing organization like science court are the need
for accurate information on which to base policy decisions and the need to limit scientists' exercise of
power by insuring that policymakers can ask scientists for scientific facts rather than policy recommendations). But see Sofaer, Science Court: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1978)
("[Many scientists fail to remain objective... [they] may possess adequate expertise, but they arc
acting in the decision-making process as biased advocates, rather than as neutral technicians.").
90. See Sofaer, supra note 89, at 10-15; see also Talbott, "Science Court". A Possible Way to
Obtain Scientific Certaintyfor Decisions Based on Scientific "Fact"?,8 ENVTL. L. 827, 838 (1978)
("It has become quite clear in modem day science that the individual scientist, either as a researcher
or in the role of a science court judge, probably is not competent to evaluate all the studies that
impact a particular field of endeavor."); Weinberg, The "Science Court" Controversy:AreOur Courts
andAgencies Adequate to Resolve New and Complex Scientific Issues? 33 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 8, 12
(1978) (concluding that legislative and administrative decisions of scientific issues are preferable to
decisions of a "court of scientific orthodoxy" attempting to render definitive judgments as to scientific truth); see also Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 827-28 (1977) (troublesome features of proposed science court include: lengthy, timeconsuming adversarial proceeding devoted solely to fact-finding may unduly emphasize importance
of factual issues at expense of underlying value choices; disagreements among experts cannot always
be resolved through fact-finding because such disagreements are often due to differing views of inferences that can be drawn from agreed-upon facts).
91. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
509, 550 (1974) ("What an appellate court needs.., is an aide who is not a witness so much as a
kind of hybrid between a master and a scientific law clerk.., to advise a court so that it could better
understand the record."); Leventhal, Remarks, 7 NAT. RESOURcES LAw. 351, 359 (1974).
92. Yellin, Science, Technology, andAdministrative Government: InstitutionalDesignsfor En vironmentalDecisionmaking,92 YALE L.J. 1300, 1330 (1983) (suggesting a "science advisory body");
Yellin, supra note 78, at 555-60.
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recommendations concerning the appropriate decision.9 3 The PBOI
serves the same function by producing an "initial decision," which is
94
then reviewed by the FDA commissioner.
Professor Yellin argues that the use of scientists in this manner can
overcome three difficulties in the present administrative process. First, it
ensures that decisionmakers in health and safety regulation cases will
have both technological and legal sophistication. 95 Yellin argues that
lawyers-who are trained to protect individual rights rather than produce scientific knowledge-are particularly ill-equipped to appreciate the
nuances of scientific issues. 9 6 The use of scientists also solves a second
problem. To give legitimacy to the administrative process, decisionmakers must issue clear and complete explanations, even for the
technologically complex aspects of their decisions. Using scientists to
make recommendations furthers that goal by ensuring that issues calling
for scientific judgment receive competent consideration. 97 The legitimacy of decisions is also enhanced because a scientific panel can consult
members of the scientific community, and its decision will reflect the current state of the scientific literature. 98 Third, the adversarial system may
not work effectively when lawyers address complex scientific issues.
Most lawyers lack the sophisticated technical knowledge necessary to understand such issues fully. The use of scientists assists the process by
producing a peer-review process whereby scientists can evaluate the
claims made by other scientists. 99 Finally, because a scientific panel already possesses an advanced level of technical expertise and thus need
not be educated by the participants in the proceeding, it is likely to be
more efficient than alternative decisionmaking processes.
2. Effect of Scientific Participationon the Hearing ModeL What
type of hearing is appropriate depends on the type of scientific input desired. One approach is to use scientific generalists, who may not be familiar with the immediate field of inquiry but, because of their
93. Yellin, supra note 78, at 555-57. The panel of special masters would be appointed by the
president and confirmed by the Senate; as a committee of scientists, engineers, and lawyers, it would
be capable of reviewing technical questions submitted by the appellate courts. It would report both
its scientific findings and the potential social and legal implications of matters referred to it. Id.
94. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 12.32(f)(1), 12.120 (1985).
95. Yellin, supra note 78, at 497, 553. Yellin notes that regulatory questions no longer consist
merely of regulatory judgments; instead, "sophisticated quantitative methods for predicting the outcomes of social decisions" are now used to "analyze and shape the scientific and technological future." Yellin, supra note 92, at 1300-02.
96. See Yellin, supra note 92, at 1312; Yellin, supra note 78, at 513-14.
97. Yellin, supra note 92, at 1324.
98. Id. at 1326-27.
99. Id. at 1332; cf Yellin, supra note 78, at 491, 553-54.
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background and training, are better able than laymen or lawyers to grasp
the issues of scientific judgment. Alternatively, one can employ recognized experts in the particular field of inquiry; these experts bring to the
process not only the relevant background and training, but also a firsthand knowledge of the controversy.
Either of these models can be varied in two ways: the type of hearing procedure employed to obtain the scientific advice and the status of
the advice obtained. Table I illustrates the possibilities:
Table I - Nature of Input
Advisory
Committees

Expert
Witnesses

Appointed
Officials

Hearing
Boards

FDA, EPA,
OSHA, CPSC

FDA, NRC,
EPA

FDA,
NRC

FDA, VA,
NRC

General or
specific
expertise

general or
specific

specific

general or
specific

general or
specific

Nature of
hearing
procedures

informal

formal

formal

informal or
formal

Advice or
decision

advice

advice

decision

decision

Agency

The most popular method for obtaining scientific input is the use of
advisory committees. For example, agencies such as FDA,10 0 EPA, 10 '
OSHA, 0 2 and CPSC 10 3 all use standing or ad hoc advisory committees,
100. The Center for Drugs uses a system of standing advisory committees to solicit advice regarding approval of new drug applications. Members of these committees are normally physicians
with experience in treating the type of disease for which the drug is intended. See infra note 122; see
generally DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG
REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT: THE USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES BY THE BUREAU OF DRUGS OF FDA (1977) [hereinafter USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES].

101. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (1983) (Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978). EPA has a standing Science Advisory Board (SAB) that meets
periodically with the EPA administrator to provide advice on the scientific and technical aspects of
environmental issues. The SAB is composed of "a body of independent scientists and engineers of
sufficient [number] and diversity to provide a range of expertise required to assess the scientific and
technical aspects of environmental issues." Ashford, The Role ofAdvisory Committees in Resolving
Regulatory Issues Involving Science and Technology: Experiencefrom OSHA and the EPA, in LAW
AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 170.
102. OSHA has a mandatory, permanent advisory committee known as the National Advisory
Committee on Occupational Safety and Health to advise the Secretaries of Labor and of Health and
Human Services on general issues pertaining to the administration of the OSHA act. In addition,
OSHA is authorized to create ad hoc advisory committees to consider specific subjects relating to the
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usually composed of scientific generalists. 04 Some agencies utilize other
types of advisory committees, such as the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS-NRC). 10 5 Scientists also testify
as expert witnesses in formal or hybrid hearings. 10 6 Some agencies also
use scientists as decisionmakers. 107 Finally, scientists are often appointed
establishment of occupational standards. Both types of committees include representatives from
labor, industry, state regulators, and scientific experts. Ashford, supra note 101, at 169.
103. See, eg., 16 C.F.R. § 1018 (1985). CPSC uses a Toxicological Advisory Board whose membership is composed of nine scientific experts, three of whom are members of the American Board of
Medical Toxicology. Id. §§ 1018.12, 1018.15.
104. See supra notes 100-03.
The Advisory Committee Act requires agencies to follow certain procedures to hold advisory
committee meetings. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1982); see Perritt & Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees
and the PoliticalProcess: The FederalAdvisory Committee Act After Two Years, 63 GEo. L.J. 725,
735 (1975) (advisory committee meetings must be open unless they concern matters exempted under
the Freedom of Information Act; meetings must also be announced in advance unless they concern
matters of national security); Tuerkheimer, Veto By Neglect: The FederalAdvisory Committee Act,
25 AM. U.L. REV. 53, 56-57 (1975) (proceedings of advisory committees must be open to public and
announced in FederalRegister; any member of public may file a written statement or appear before
the committee; detailed minutes of the meetings must be kept). Agency regulations impose additional procedures. For example, the FDA requires advisory committees to hear presentations from
parties affected by proposed agency actions. USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITrEES, supra
note 100, at 94-99. FDA advisory committees are also required to issue written reports of their
recommendations. Id. at 109 (citing FDA Regulations on Administrative Functions, Practices and
Procedures § 2.372, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,148 (1976)). The advisory committees merely file the minutes
of the meetings as formal public records rather than issuing separate reports.
105. See generally Grobstein, The Role of the NationalAcademy of Sciences in Public Policy and
Regulatory Decision Making, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 115. For
example, the FDA on four occasions in the 1960's asked the NAS-NRC for advice concerning
whether it should ban saccharin, an artificial sweetener, because certain studies indicated that the
additive was an animal carcinogen. Based on the advice it received, the agency decided against
removing saccharin from the market until additional animal research was undertaken. See id. at
130-32 (discussing FDA's examination of saccharin generally).
106. For example, in the FDA's formal hearing process, direct testimony of witnesses is submitted in advance in writing. See 21 C.F.R. § 12.87(b) ("evidence ... developed to the maximum
extent through written submissions"). The actual hearing process consists of the cross-examination
of expert and other witnesses. See 21 C.F.R. § 12.87(b)(1)(ii) (oral cross-examination permitted if
"it appears that alternative means of developing the evidence are insufficient").
107. At some agencies, politically appointed officials are chosen because of their general scientific
backgrounds. Recent FDA commissioners have been physicians or scientists. These include Arthur
Hayes, Jr., M.D.; Jere Goyan, Ph.D.; Donald Kennedy, Ph.D.; and Alexander Schmidt, M.D.
WHO'S WHO INAMERICA 1261, 1428, 1755, 2898 (1984). Similarly, the membership of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) often includes physicists and engineers. See D. FORD, THE CULT
OF THE ATOM: THE SECRET PAPERS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 213 (1982). At both
agencies, these officials are responsible for making final licensing decisions as part of a formal hearing process that includes an initial decision or decisions by an ALJ or by hearing boards. At the
FDA, the commissioner reviews an initial decision by an ALJ who recommends whether a new drug
or food additive should be licensed. See 21 C.F.R. § 12.125 (1985). At the NRC, the Commission
can review the decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. 10 C.F.R. § 2.786
(1985).
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to serve on hearing boards of various types. 108
The PBOI and the other hearing procedures offered by the FDA as

alternatives to a formal hearing also involve scientists, 109 but they differ
from the methods used by other agencies in three significant ways. The
hearing is not conducted according to the APA procedures for adjudication, 110 the hearing panels consist only of scientists, I I' and the scientists,
112
except for the commissioner, are not agency employees.
3.

The Rationale for the PBOL

When the FDA designed the

PBOI, the agency was aware that it was creating a procedure that differed in important ways from the other methods by which scientific input
is obtained. Its rationale for the PBOI was similar to the arguments
made on behalf of a science court. Unlike the proponents of the original
science court proposal, the FDA distrusted the use of advocacy proce-

dures for scientific and regulatory disputes. The agency had a disastrous
experience with formal rulemaking hearings in the 1960's."

3

By com-

parison, it had a productive experience with its advisory committee sys14
tem in about the same period.
The FDA originally justified the PBOI proposal on the ground that

"inthose situations where complex scientific and medical issues are involved, a searching scientific inquiry conducted by independent experts

may well be more appropriate to resolve the matters involved than a formal evidentiary public hearing."" 5 The agency noted that "[t]here had
been substantial concern expressed in recent years about the need for
108. The NRC uses either an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board or an ALJ to conduct the
initial hearing concerning the licensing of nuclear power plants. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.721 (1986). One
member of the board is a lawyer, and the two others are scientists or engineers who have "such
technical or other qualifications as the Commission ... deems appropriate to the issues to be decided." See id. The hearing process is formal adjudication. Id. §§ 2.700-.700a. Decisions by an
AIJ or a board are reviewed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. Id. § 2.786. Membership of the appeals board, which can include scientists or engineers, is drawn from the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel and is chosen based on "qualifications deemed appropriate to the
issues to be decided." .d. § 2.787.
The Veterans Administration (VA) also uses an appeals board whose membership includes
scientists. The Board of Veterans Appeals hears appeals from initial disability determinations in
panels of three members, one of whom is usually a physician. F. BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.7 (1984). Unlike the NRC, however, the VA does not require that the
physician be a specialist in the disease or injury involved in the appeal. Id.
109. See supra notes 9-11, 14 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
I11.See supra notes 9-11, 14 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
113. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
114. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
115. Administrative Practices and Procedures: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 Fed. Reg.
40,682, 40,699 (1975) [hereinafter Administrative Practices].
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development of more appropriate procedures than [a] trial-type hearing

for resolving difficult scientific issues." 116 The agency believed that its
version of the science court responded to these concerns by combining

"the features of traditional scientific inquiry with the need of the law to
develop a full record on which to base the Commissioner's decision and
117
subsequent judicial review."

The FDA became interested in using a scientific type of inquiry in
part because of its desire "to avoid inappropriate use or abuse of formal
trial-type hearings."" 8 The commissioner explained that the FDA's experience with formal rulemaking hearings in the 1960's had been the sub-

ject of "virtually unanimous criticism" on the ground that they were a
hopelessly inefficient method of resolving questions commonly faced by
the agency. 1 9 The commissioner noted that the PBOI incorporated

some of the reforms suggested by these critics. 20

The FDA's interest in the scientific type of inquiry also grew out of
its belief that advocacy procedures, even when properly used, were inappropriate for scientific disputes. The preamble to the proposed PBOI
quoted Professor Gellhorn's observation that "some of this country's

gravest administrative deficiencies stem from lawyer-induced overreliance on courtroom methods to cope with problems."' 12 The FDA be-

lieved that the "scientific seminar" model of decisionmaking that its
advisory committees followed was more appropriate.

22

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 40,698. In fact, the agency took over eleven years to determine what percentage of
peanut content was required before a product could be labeled as "peanut butter." See Hamilton,
supra note 63, at 1143-45; Note, supra note 71, at 732.
120. Administrative Practices, supra note 115, at 40,698-99.
121. Id. at 40,698 (quoting Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial,48
A.B.A. J. 243, 243 (1962)).
122. Telephone interview with Peter Hutt, former FDA General Counsel (July 1, 1985) [hereinafter Hutt Interview].
Since the early 1960's, the FDA has used panels of independent scientists to advise the agency
on specific scientific issues. USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITrEES, supra note 100, at 7-8.
The Center for Drugs and Biologics, for example, has a formal system of eighteen standing advisory
committees to which it refers questions for advice concerning the safety and efficacy of new drugs.
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 14.100, 14.171 (1985). The Center for Devices and Radiological Health has sixteen standing advisory committees. Id. In addition, the commissioner is authorized to create "color
additive advisory committees" for advice concerning the safety of color additives. Id. § 14.140.
Members of advisory committees, who are chosen by the commissioner from nominations by interested persons and groups, are either voting or nonvoting members. Id. § 14.80. To be eligible,
voting members are required to "have expertise in the subject matter with which the committee is
concerned and have diverse professional education, training, and experience so that [a] committee
will reflect a balanced composition of sufficient scientific expertise to handle the problems that come
before it." Id. § 14.80(b)(1)(i). To be eligible, voting members must also pass the FDA's conflict-ofinterest regulations. Iad § 14.80(a)(2). Nonvoting members are chosen "to represent and serve as a
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The FDA hoped that the advisory committee procedure's advan124 It
tages of accuracy and legitimacy 23 might also inhere in the PBOI.
also believed that the PBOI would have three important advantages over
the traditional advisory committee. First, it would mean that an FDA
licensing decision would be reviewed by an independent panel of outside
experts. FDA regulations provide that a party may be entitled to a hearing, such as a PBOI, to contest an agency decision whether to license a
new drug or food additive.1 25 The FDA believed that the PBOI would
complement its advisory committees, which perform their functions
before the agency makes its licensing decisions. 126 The FDA anticipated
that the accuracy and legitimacy of its decisions would thus be enhanced. 127 Second, the PBOI would subject the FDA's decision to more
intense scrutiny than is normally applied in advisory committee meetings.128 Finally, the PBOI format would encourage greater public participation than the advisory committee format allows.' 29 This "open"
aspect of the PBOI was intended to make the agency more accountable
to interested parties, to enhance the FDA's public image, and to bolster
liaison with interested individuals and organizations," such as consumer and other interest groups.
Id. § 14.84(a).
Advisory committee meetings have three stages: presentation, discussion, and deliberation.
Various interest groups will present information. If a new drug is under consideration, for example,
those presenting information include representatives from the pharmaceutical company that is seeking approval for the drug, from the FDA scientific staff, and occasionally from public interest organizations. USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES, supra note 100, at 94. The nature of the
deliberation process varies from committee to committee, but decisions are usually made by consensus. Id. at 103. In cases of disagreement, there will be a formal vote. Id. at 103-04. FDA regulations require advisory committee decisions to be in writing, but the required report "may consist of
the approved minutes of the meeting or a separate written report." 21 C.F.R. § 14.174 (1985). In
either form, the report must respond "to the specific issues or questions which the Commissioner has
addressed to the advisory committee" and to state "the basis of the advice and recommendations of
the committee." Id.
123. A government study reported:
Experts provide valuable advice on complex technical issues and assist the agency in deciding critical questions of scientific judgment.... [A]dvisory committees [also] offer FDA a
dialogue with the nation's foremost experts in drug therapy. The committees are thus an
important source of peer review for proposed FDA decisions. For these reasons, use of
advisory committees increases public and industry acceptance of FDA decisions and improves the credibility of the agency.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, FINAL REPORT 52 (1977) [hereinafter HEW FINAL REPORT].
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
127. Interview with Katherine Copp and Fletcher Campbell, Counsel for the Center for Drugs
and Biologics, Depo-Provera Hearing, in Washington, D.C. (June 27, 1985) [hereinafter Copp and
Campbell Interview]; see infra notes 320-46 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 322-28 and accompanying text.
129. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127; Interview with Jeff Stribling, Counsel for
Depo-Provera PBOI, in Washington, D.C. (June 25, 1985) [hereinafter Stribling Interview].
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the agency's reputation for respecting scientific expertise. 130
The FDA hoped the PBOI had one other advantage. One function
of advisory committees is to develop a consensus among scientists on
difficult issues requiring scientific judgment.' 3 ' The agency hoped that
132
the PBOI might serve this function as well.
The FDA clearly had "high hopes" for the PBOI. The agency saw
it as more efficient, more accurate, and more legitimate than a formal
hearing. The PBOI would be more efficient because it would be largely
nonadversarial. It would be more accurate because the board was composed of experts. Finally, it would be more legitimate because the PBOI
process was both more open and more likely to lead to a consensus on
difficult scientific issues.
II.

A.

APPLICATIONS OF THE

PBOI

PROCEDURE

The "Aspartame" Case.

Aspartame, which is sold under the brand name of NutraSweet, is a
popular food additive commonly used as a sugar substitute in diet soft
drinks and other products. The FDA's 1981 decision to approve aspartame ended years of controversy surrounding saccharin, another
sugar substitute; aspartame has almost completely replaced saccharin in
the marketplace. 133 The FDA had attempted to ban the use of saccharin
on the ground that it was an animal carcinogen, but Congress overruled
the agency and instead required a label that warned consumers of that
hazard.1 34 The agency had previously banned the sale of cyclamates on
the same ground. 1 35 As a result, there was considerable public interest in
136
whether aspartame presented similar problems.
130. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127; Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
131. Hutt Interview, supra note 122; cf. USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES, supra
note 100, at 103 (most advisory committee decisions are by "consensus").
132. Hutt Interview, supra note 122.
133. See, e.g., Searle Sweetener Expands Its Market, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at D4, col. 5
(six major soft-drink makers decide to use aspartame in diet soft drinks); Aspartame Builds a Market, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1983, at 29, col. 3 (describing market displacement of saccharin by aspartame); Searle's Push into Sweeteners, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, § 3, at 4, col. 3 (describing the
commercial introduction of aspartame).
134. See Cooper, supra note 38, at 43-65.
135. Food Additives: Exemption of Certain Food Additives from the Requirement of Tolerances, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063, 17,063 (1969); see also New Drugs: Procedural and Interpretive Regulations, 35 Fed. Reg. 13,644, 13,644-45 (1970).
136. This public interest was heightened by two events. One was the discovery that the Searle
Company, which owned the patent on aspartame, had hired an animal research firm that had previously submitted fraudulent data to the FDA for other companies. The other was that a prominent
public interest advocate, James Turner, had challenged the FDA's announcement that it intended to
approve aspartame.
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1. Pre-HearingProcess. In March 1973, G. D. Searle & Co. peti-

tioned the FDA to approve the use of aspartame in foods. 137 After the
FDA issued the requested regulation in July 1974,138 two requests for a
hearing were received.139 At that time, the agency stayed its regulation
approving the use of aspartame.14°
The two parties questioning aspartame's safety were Dr. John O1ney, a professor of psychiatry at Washington University School of

Medicine, in St. Louis, and James S. Turner, a lawyer who represented
himself and a consumer group called Legal Action for Buyer's Education
and Labeling (LABEL). Both waived their right to a formal evidentiary
hearing and requested that the FDA convene a Public Board of In-

quiry.' 4 1 The FDA granted that request,1 42 and also granted the requests
of six interested persons to make oral presentations as nonparty participants. 43 The PBOI hired two consultants. 144
The FDA postponed convening the board until it could resolve the
question whether certain of Searle's animal data were unreliable. 145 Uni-

versities Associated for Research and Education in Pathology (UAREP)
had reviewed the data in question.1 46 The FDA received the UAREP

report on December 13, 1978, and agreed with its conclusion that the
147
Searle data were authentic.

In preparation for the PBOI, the FDA negotiated with Olney and
Turner concerning the scope of the issues to be decided by the board.
The following questions were submitted to the board: (1) whether the

ingestion of aspartame, alone or in conjunction with glutamate, poses a
risk in humans of mental retardation or other brain-related injuries;
137. G.D. Searle & Co.: Notice of Filing of Petition for Food Additive, 38 Fed. Reg. 5921, 5921
(1973).
138. Food Additives: Food Additives Permitted in Food for Human Consumption, 39 Fed.
Reg. 27,317, 27,319 (1974); see also Food Additives: Aspartame; Correction, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,520,
34,520 (1974) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 172.804 (1974)).
139. See Aspartame; Stay of Effectiveness of Food Additive Regulation, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907
(1975); Aspartame; Commissioner's Final Decision, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,283, 38,285 (1981) [hereinafter
Commissioner's Final Decision].
140. Aspartame; Stay of Effectiveness of Food Additive Regulation, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907 (1975).
141. Id.
142. Aspartame; Ruling on Objections and Notice of Hearing Before a Public Board of Inquiry,
44 Fed. Reg. 31,716 (1979).
143. 45 Fed. Reg. 2908 (1980). The six presenters were: the Bureau of Foods, FDA; John W.
Olney, M.D.; James S. Turner, G.D. Searle & Co.; Lloyd J. Filer, Jr., M.D.; and Richard J.
Wurtman, M.D. Id.
144. The consultants were William Nyhan, M.D., and Milton Brightman, M.D., 46 Fed. Reg.
38,286 & n.2 (1981).
145. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,717 (1979).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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(2) whether the ingestion of aspartame may induce brain tumors in rats;
and (3) whether, in light of the answers to these questions, the FDA
148
should allow the use of aspartame in foods.
Olney, Searle, and the FDA's Center for Food Additives all submitted nominees for the PBOI; 149 the FDA chose Dr. Walle Hauta of the
Department of Psychology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as
chairman; Dr. Peter J. Lampert of the Department of Pathology, University of California at San Diego; and Dr. Vernon Young of the Department of Nutrition and Food Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. 150
2. HearingProcess. The January 1980 PBOI hearing lasted three
days and consisted of three sets of presentations by Olney, the Bureau of
Foods, and Searle.' 5 1 Each set of presentations addressed one of the
three questions given to the board by the commissioner and followed a
format similar to that of scientific meetings, allowing for the use of illustrative slides 152 and for interruptions and questions from board members. 153 The other persons present were not allowed to interrupt the
154
presentations.
Following the presentations, the parties, nonparty participants, and
the board's consultants were allowed to make comments or to question
witnesses or other participants in the hearing.1 5 5 Several times during
these question periods the proceeding resembled a roundtable discussion.
These interchanges were almost always nonconfrontational and
nonadversarial in nature.15 6 Lawyers did not participate in the hearing
in any capacity, except for occasional comments by Turner, who was one
of the parties.' 5 7
148. See Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,286.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,286. For examples of these

presentations, see [In the matter of] Aspartame, No. 75-F-0355, Hearing Record at 5 (Dec. 30, 1980)
(presentation of Neil Singletary, M.D., Bureau of Foods) [hereinafter Aspartame Record]; id. at 25
(presentation of John Olney, M.D.); id. at 86 (presentation of Louis Stegink, M.D., Searle

consultant).
152. See, eg., Aspartame Record, supra note 151, at 87 (presentation of Louis Stegink, M.D.,
Searle consultant).
153. See, eg., Aspartame Record, supra note 151, at 130-33 (questions by Board members dur-

ing presentation of Louis Stegink, M.D., Searle consultant).
154. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
155. See, eg., Aspartame Record, supra note 151, at 197 (comments of Richard Wurtman,
M.D., nonparty participant).
156. Interview with Robert Becker and Peter Safir, Counsel for Searle, Aspartame Hearing, in
Washington, D.C. (June 24, 1985) [hereinafter Becker and Safir Interview].
157. See, eg., Aspartame Record, supra note 151, at 234-36.
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3. Post-HearingProcess. On October 1, 1980, the board recommended that the FDA revoke its approval of aspartame until additional

safety testing could be performed.1 58 Although the board concluded that
aspartame did not pose a risk of mental retardation or other brain injury,

it also determined that there was insufficient evidence to determine
whether aspartame induced tumors in rats. 159 On July 24, 1981, the

FDA commissioner issued his final decision, which favored the approval
of aspartame. 160 Consequently, the FDA reinstated the aspartame

regulation. 161
The commissioner affirmed the board's finding that aspartame did
not pose a risk of brain injuries. 162 The question had arisen because as-

partame is composed of two amino acids, phenylalanine (PHE) and aspartic acid (ASP), both of which-previous studies had shown-could be

dangerous.'

63

Prolonged concentrations of PHE in a person's blood

plasma can cause brain damage, 164 and a one-time concentration (or
surge) of ASP can cause nerve cell damage (focal brain lesions) and

neuroendocrine dysfunctions. 165 To resolve whether aspartame could

have these effects, the PBOI engaged in a two-part inquiry. First, the

board evaluated published studies to determine the toxic threshold 166 for
PHE and ASP. Then the board determined whether, based on other
studies, the use of aspartame would cause individuals to consume more
than the toxic threshold amount of PHE or ASP. 167 The board and the
commissioner both concluded that the use of aspartame posed no risk

that PHE 168 or ASP 169 would be absorbed above their toxic thresholds.

158. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,286.
159. In the Matter of Aspartame, Initial Decision of Public Board of Inquiry 49 (1980) [herein.
after Aspartame PBOI Decision]; see also [In the matter of] Aspartame, [Transfer Binder, Develop.
ments 1980-81] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCII) 1 38,072, at 38,349 (1980) (excerpted version of
PBOI decision).
160. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,285.
161. Food Additives Permitted for Direct Addition to Food for Human Consumption; Reinstatement of Regulation for Aspartame, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,947, 50,948 (1981).
162. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,285.
163. See Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 10; see also Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,287-94.
164. See Aspartame PBOI Decision, supranote 159, at 10; see also Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,290.
165. See Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 22; see also Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,291.
166. The toxic threshold is the highest dosage at which no adverse effects are observed. See
Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 11.
167. Id.
168. For PHE, the board evaluated studies in which normal adults, pregnant women, one-yearold children, and PKU children consumed large amounts of aspartame. PKU (phenylketonura) is
an inherited disorder in which the body cannot rid itself of PHE. The accumulated PHE can cause
severe mental retardation. Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 11-12. The board ex-
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The board' 70 and the commissioner 171 both rejected arguments that
PHE was dangerous to certain children and fetuses on the regulatory, or
policy, ground that aspartame posed no greater risk of harm to these
persons than the consumption of protein found in many products already
on the market.172 Both also rejected arguments that the board had incorrectly evaluated the evidence concerning ASP by disregarding relevant
73
studies and overemphasizing irrelevant studies.'
The commissioner and the board disagreed, however, on the correctness of the board's interpretation of the rat studies conducted by
Searle.' 74 This issue had arisen because some test animals fed aspartame
had developed brain tumors. 175 The FDA had asked the board to decide
whether these experiments had "biological significance"-whether a
causal relationship existed between the development of the tumors and
consumption of aspartame by the test animals. 17 6 The board found that
one of the three available studies implied a causal relationship; problems
with the other studies prevented any firm conclusions. 77 The commisamined how the ingestion of aspartame affected the PHE levels in these test subjects. Based on the
results, the board concluded that individuals could not consume enough aspartame to raise their
PHE levels to the toxic threshold. Id. at 13-21.
169. For ASP, the board established a toxic threshold by using data from the most sensitive
species tested and from the most sensitive age group of that species. Id at 23-26, 36. This choice
was made because nerve cell damage can occur from only one surge of toxic ASP concentrations.
Id. at 36. Based on previous studies concerning consumption of glutamic acid (GLU), which is
metabolized in the same way as ASP, the board concluded that the biological mechanisms that
protect humans from GLU and ASP surges would not be overcome by the use of aspartame. The
board noted that this conclusion was correct even though it chose a low toxic threshold. Id. at 38.
The commissioner affirmed these conclusions with minor exceptions. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,292, 38,294.
170. Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 20-22.
171. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,291.
172. See Letter from John W. Olney, M.D., to FDA Commissioner Goyan, at 1 (Dec. 19, 1980)
(exceptions to PBOI decision on aspartame) [hereinafter Olney Exceptions]. For a description of the
dangers of PHE, see supra note 168.
173. These arguments were made by Dr. Olney. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note
139, at 38,293 (suggesting that Olney exceptions presented a "one-sided" view of the data and emphasizing the safety found to be associated with the use of aspartame in human studies); see also
Olney Exceptions, supra note 172, at 2-6 ("[E]vidence presented at the PBOI... must be considered
'deficient' in the sense that none of the studies was designed to answer the specific question whether
blood Glu/Asp levels do or do not rise above the toxic threshold in immature humans following
ingestion of Glu + Asm.").
174. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,300.
175. Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 40.
176. See supra notes 4243 and accompanying text.
177. Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 4547. The board found one study troubling
because it indicated a high rate of death in young test rats and a possible dose-effect relationship. Id.
at 47. The board found a second study "puzzling" because it used an insufficient number of experimental animals and "bizarre" because the control group had a higher incidence of brain tumors than
the board thought was normal. Id.; see infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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sioner determined that the board had based its conclusion on evidence
marred by calculation 178 and evaluation errors. 179 As a result, the com-

missioner concluded that the test group of rats did not have a statistically
0
significant higher incidence of tumors than those in the control group. 18
The significant difference between the commissioner and the board
on this issue concerned a matter of scientific judgment. The board concluded that one animal study was invalid because the incidence of tumors
in the control group of rats was higher than normal for spontaneous tumors in that type of animal. 18 The commissioner disagreed. He found
that the incidence of tumors in the control group was consistent with the
82
incidence rate of spontaneous tumors indicated by the literature. 1
The commissioner also overruled the board on the third issue:
whether aspartame should be licensed. The board had taken the position
that, because there was evidence indicating that aspartame might cause
brain tumors, the safety of the product could not be determined without
additional testing. 183 The commissioner, however, concluded that the
product could be marketed because the Searle data did not suggest that
aspartame caused brain tumors. 184 The commissioner also refused to call
a new hearing concerning a fourth issue raised on appeal: whether or not
1 85
the Searle data were authentic.
One year later, Searle petitioned the FDA to amend the food addi86
tive regulation to permit the use of aspartame in carbonated beverages.
178. The commissioner held that the board's finding of a causal relationship in one study was
erroneous because the Board had made a factual error in calculating the age at which some young
rats had died. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,300. He also found that the
Board had made a statistical error in calculating a possible dose-response relationship by improperly
adding the results of two studies. Id. at 38,299.
179. The commissioner rejected the board's conclusion that one study was unreliable, because he
found Searle had used a sufficient number of test animals, id. at 38,300, and because the board was
mistaken concerning the normal incidence of tumors for a control group. See infra notes 181-82 and
accompanying text.
180. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,301.
181. Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 42-47; see also Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,295.
182. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,295.
183. Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 49.
184. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,303.
185. Before the PBOI was convened, FDA investigated the possibility that the Searle data might
be fraudulent, but the agency pronounced the data valid after the results were independently verified.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text. James Turner argued that the board had to determine
the authenticity of the studies because that issue was directly relevant to any determination of safety.
See Exceptions for Turner at 1-3, [In the matter of] Aspartame, No. 75-F-0355 (Dec. 17, 1980)
[hereinafter Turner Exceptions]. The commissioner affirmed the PBOI's determination that the issue was outside the scope of the hearing because it was not one of the charges he originally made to
the PBOI. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,301.
186. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,140 (1982).
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FDA amended the regulation as requested. 187 Although objections were
filed by several parties," 8 the FDA initially denied their request for a
stay' 89 and ultimately denied their request for a hearing. 190
The FDA's decision to license aspartame for use in carbonated beverages was affirmed in Community Nutrition Institute v. Novitch. 19'
Based on the tests and studies evaluated by the agency, the court determined that the FDA's decision was justified. 192 The court concluded,
therefore, that those who objected to the use of aspartame in beverages
had not raised any material issue that required the FDA to hold further
193
hearings.
B.

The "'Depo-Provera"Case.

Depo-provera is approved for use in over ninety countries as an injectable contraceptive. It has been licensed in almost all countries where
94
approval has been sought, the major exception being the United States.
The Upjohn Company ("Upjohn") has sought regulatory approval in the
United States for over twenty-five years.' 95 The PBOI convened by the
FDA to consider approval of depo-provera recommended against licensing the drug. To date, the commissioner has not acted on this recommendation. By comparison, a panel of scientific experts in Great Britain
recommended that the drug be approved, and in 1984 the British licens96
ing authority agreed.'
The FDA's actions concerning depo-provera generated considerable
public interest. 197 Forty-four individuals and organizations participated
in the PBOI proceeding, including representatives from the National
Cancer Institute, the National World Health Network, the World Health
Organization, and the Agency for International Development.' 98
187. 48 Fed. Reg. 31,376 (1983).
188. See id
189. 48 Fed. Reg. 42,899 (1983).
190. 49 Fed. Reg. 6672, 6681 (1984). This reference also contains a complete publication of
FDA's final rule concerning Aspartame. Id. at 6672.
191. 773 F.2d 1356, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 1363.
193. Id. at 1367.
194. Richard & Lasagna, Depo-Provera: Comparison of the U.K. and U.S. Advisory Board Recommendations 3 (Aug. 20, 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
195. See infra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
196. Richard & Lasagna, supra note 194, at 6.
197. See Rosenfield, Maine, Rochat, Shelton & Hatcher, The Foodand DrugAdministrationand
MedroxyprogesteroneAcetate: What Are the Issues?, 249 J. AM. MED. A. 2922, 2923 (1983) (chronicling FDA actions and discussing pertinent scientific literature).
198. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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1. Pre-Hearing Process. In 1960, the FDA approved depoprovera' 99 for the treatment of two problems associated with pregnancy. 2°° In 1963, Upjohn petitioned the FDA for permission to begin
clinical studies to determine depo-provera's safety and efficacy as a con-

traceptive. 20 1 In 1967, Upjohn submitted data from experiments in
which depo-provera was used as a contraceptive through intramuscular
injection in humans. 202 Seven years later, the FDA permitted Upjohn to
20 3
market the drug as a contraceptive.
In October 1974, less than two months after approving the drug, the
FDA stayed its approval, 2°4 an action prompted by Congress's concern

that depo-provera might increase the risk of cervical cancer. 20 5 In 1978,
the agency withdrew its approval based on evidence indicating that depoprovera caused mammary tumors in beagles. 20 6 In the same year,
Upjohn waived its right to a formal evidentiary hearing, and the FDA
granted its request for a PBOI.20 7 When the FDA invited interested persons to submit notices of participation, 20 8 forty-four persons responded
209
and made presentations to the board.
In 1981, after the required nomination process, the FDA named the

members of the PBOI: Dr. Judith Weisz of the Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology, Pennsylvania State University Medical Center; Dr.
Paul Stolley of the Department of Research Medicine, University of
Pennsylvania; and Dr. Griff Ross, Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs,
199. Depot medroxyprogesterone acetate or DMPA. See Rosenfield, Maine, Rochat, Shelton &
Hatcher, supra note 197, at 2922.
200. The health problems were endometriosis, which is the presence of endometrial tissue
outside the uterus, and habitual, or threatened, spontaneous abortions. Weisz, Ross & Stolley, Report of the Public Board of Inquiry on Depo-Provera 8 (Oct. 17, 1984) (unpublished report on file
with author) [hereinafter PBOI Report]; see [New Matters] FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 1
38,29 1, at 39,635-36 (Dec. 3, 1984) (excerpts of PBOI Report).
201. See 38 Fed. Reg. 27,940, 27,940 (1973).
202. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,555, 28,555-56 (1978).
203. 39 Fed. Reg. 32,907, 32,910 (1974). Prior to this action, however, FDA withdrew its approval of depo-provera for use in pregnancy-related problems because there was insufficient evidence
that it was effective for those purposes. 38 Fed. Reg. 27,940 (1973).
204. 39 Fed. Reg. 38,227 (1974).
205. Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administration: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on IntergovernmentalRelations, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 323-41, 353-90 (1974) (statements
of Rep. Fountain).
206. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,556 (1978).
207. 44 Fed. Reg. 44,275 (1979).
208. Id. at 44,274.
209. Participants included representatives from the Centers for Disease Control, the National
Cancer Institute, the National World Health Network, the World Health Organization, the Agency
for International Development, and a host of American medical schools. See Transcript of DepoProvera PBOI Hearing (No. 75N-0124), at 2-2a (Jan. 10, 1983), 2-2a (Jan. 11, 1983), 2-3 (Jan. 12,
1983), 2-2a (Jan. 13, 1983), and 1-la (Jan. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Depo-Provera Transcript].
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The University of Texas Medical School, Houston. 2 10 The hearing, however, was not convened until January 1983.211 In the intervening period,
there was a pre-hearing conference2 12 and an opportunity for participants
to submit data that post-dated the FDA's 1978 decision to withdraw
approval. 213
2. Hearing Process. The depo-provera hearing, which lasted five
days, 2 14 was followed by a second, one-day hearing2

15

to receive a special

consultants.21 6

report from six
The initial hearing consisted of presentations by Upjohn, by the FDA's National Center for Drugs and Biologics
(now the Center for Drugs and Biologics), and by many nonparty participants. 2 17 Upjohn and the Center for Drugs and Biologics were each
given one day for their presentations. 21 8 Three days were allocated for
presentations by nonparty participants. 2 19 Unlike the aspartame hearing,
where witnesses appeared several times and discussed issues one at a
time, 220 each presentor was free to cover any of the issues that were
before the PBOI.
The board members often asked witnesses specific questions concerning a particular matter or piece of evidence. 22 1 Questions by the parties and participants were handled differently as the hearing progressed.
On the first day, the board asked the questions they received at the end of
the day, when Upjohn had completed its presentations. For the remainder of the hearing, the board asked the participants' questions at the end
of each presentation. 222 During the first two days, the board attempted
to ask all of the questions submitted by the participants. At the start of
the third day, the board announced that the previous policy had become
210. Id. at 2 (Jan. 10, 1983).
211. 47 Fed. Reg. 55,518 (1982).
212. 47 Fed. Reg. 36,470 (1982).
213. 47 Fed. Reg. 346 (1982).
214. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 4, 15.
215. 48 Fed. Reg. 31,910 (1983).
216. The panel consisted of "6 consulting pathologists who reviewed the histopathology slides
from the monkey study to determine the nature and origin of the malignant tumors in 2 of 12
survivor monkeys in the high-dose Depo-Provera group." PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 15. The
PBOI regulations provide for a second hearing to resolve a particular scientific issue. See supra note
24 and accompanying text.
217. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 4.
218. Depo-Provera Transcript, supra note 209, at 2-3 (Jan. 10, 1983); id. at 2-3 (Jan. 11, 1983).
219. Id. at 2-3 (Jan. 12, 1983); id. at 2-3 (Jan. 13, 1983); id. at 1-2 (Jan. 14, 1983).
220. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
221. See, eg., Depo-Provera Transcript, supra note 209, at 225-45 (Jan. 11, 1983) (board members inquired into the experimental methods used in examining the effect of depo-provera on female
reproductive system); id. at 11-25 (Jan. 14, 1983) (board inquired into the reliability of a study of
depo-provera's carcinogenicity); see also Stribling Interview, supra note 130.
222. Depo-Provera Transcript, supra note 209, at 4-5 (Jan. 11, 1983).
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unwieldy. It decided, therefore, to raise only those questions that "will

be helpful in obtaining the kind of information that we need to make our
decision."

223

The tenor of the proceeding resembled a legislative hearing rather
than the scientific-seminar atmosphere of the aspartame proceeding. In
the aspartame hearing, there was often a direct exchange or debate
among the board, the participants, and the consultants.2 24 In the depoprovera hearing, non-board members did not participate directly; their
225
questions were funneled through the board members.
This hearing, however, was also conducted in a nonconfrontational
and nonadversarial manner. Although the questioning was often sharp,
it was more congenial than a cross-examination. 226 Further, there was

almost no direct participation by lawyers in this proceeding, except when
the legal counsel for some participants offered a closing summary of the
evidence.
3.

22 7

Post-HearingProcess. In October 1984, the PBOI submitted

its decision. 228 The PBOI recommended that depo-provera should not be
approved for use as a human contraceptive because of inadequate information regarding the drug's safety. 229 The commissioner has not issued
a final report.
The commissioner had charged the board to resolve seven questions,
including "[w]hether, in comparison with other drugs approved for contraception, the benefits of Depo-Provera . . . outweigh its risks under
conditions of general marketing. ' 230 The other questions addressed
whether the drug had carcinogenic or teratogenic potential, 2 31 whether
there were other problems associated with the drug, 232 and whether the
223. Id. at 4 (Jan. 12, 1983).
224. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 221.
227. Interview with Solomon Sobel, M.D., Director of the FDA Division of Metabolism & Endocrine Drug Products, in Washington, D.C. (June 26, 1985) [hereinafter Sobel Interview].
228. 49 Fed. Reg. 43,507 (1984).
229. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 179.
230. Id. at 2.
231. The commissioner asked the board whether "datafrom beagle dog and monkey studies
submitted by Upjohn indicate a potential risk ofbreast or endometrial cancer in humans from DepoProvera"; whether "the human data submitted by-Upjohn can, as Upjohn claims, successfully refute
the risk ofhuman cancer suggested by the animal data"; and whether, "in the event of contraceptive
failure, use of Depo-Provera may increase the risk of teratogenic effects to a greater extent than
would other systemic contraceptives." Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
232. The commissioner asked the board whether, "in view of Depo-Provera's adverse side effects
or pharmacologic effect, estrogen therapy is likely to be prescribed in addition to Depo-Provera in a
significant number of patients," and whether "an approval of Depo-Provera for contraception under
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drug might be safe and effective for only some types of patients.2 33
The board's recommendation that depo-provera not be approved
was based principally on its concern about the drug's carcinogenic effects. 234 Dogs and monkeys who were administered depo-provera developed malignant tumors. The board concluded that Upjohn's animal
studies indicated the drug might have been the cause of the tumors,2 35
and rejected Upjohn's contention that, because of the physiological differences between experimental animals and humans, the animal studies
were not relevant evidence of the carcinogenic risk in humans. 2 36 The
board also rejected the contention that Upjohn's clinical data success-

fully rebutted the inferences from the animal data that depo-provera
might be carcinogenic. Although there were many published studies

concerning the use of depo-provera in other countries, the board concluded that this evidence was inconclusive because of methodological
problems.2 37
general marketing conditions is likely to increaseuse of the drug as a contraceptive underconditions
not stipulated in the approved labeling or is it [sic] likely to increase use of the drugfor unrelated
indications" Id. (emphasis in original). On its own initiative, the board investigated whether the
drug would affect bone and plasma lipoproteins. Id. at 7.
233. The commissioner asked the board whether "there are conditions of labelingand distribution controls which would permit marketing of Depo-Provera as a safe and effective drugon a limited
basis (i.e., Whether there may be certainpatients in the U.S. for whom benefits of Depo-Provera for
contraception outweigh the risks)." Id at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
234. Id. at 173-75. The other issues either were decided in a way that favored Upjohn or were
not reached in light of the board's disposition of the cancer issue. The PBOI decided that there was
no evidence to suggest that depo-provera posed greater risks to fetuses than other approved contraceptives, id. at 115-16; it was unlikely that estrogen therapy would be used in conjunction with the
drug because it would be ineffective for that purpose, id. at 145; no decision was necessary concerning possible unapproved uses given the board's recommendation not to approve the drug, id. at 166;
and the drug should not be licensed for any limited group of women because risk-benefit decisions
could be made appropriately only on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 169. One member of the board
would have approved depo-provera for two groups of women: the mentally retarded and drug addicts. Id. at 170.
235. Id. at 24, 30-31, 68-69. The strongest evidence was the fact that the beagle study indicated
a dose-response relationship: the frequency and timing of the tumors in the test group of animals
varied in relationship to the amount of the drug administered. Id. at 30. See supra notes 38-41 and
accompanying text (description of criteria used to evaluate animal studies).
236. See Exceptions To Report of Public Board of Inquiry and Brief for the Upjohn Company at
41-47, [In the Matter of] Depo-Provera Sterile Aqueous Suspension for Contraception, 78N-0124
(Jan. 24, 1985) [hereinafter Upjohn Exceptions]. Although some physiological differences are generally recognized, the board rejected Upjohn's argument on the ground that Upjohn's claims were
speculative and unsubstantiated. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 54, 64.
237. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 80-81. The board's principal objections were that there
were too few women in each study and no long-term systematic studies had been conducted. Id. at
87-88. Other problems were inadequate or inappropriate control groups, failure to control or adjust
for other causes of risk, lack of documentation, and lack of information on whether women in the
United States were comparable to women in the studies. Id. at 85-88.
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The board based its conclusions about the carcinogenic potential of
depo-provera on an evaluation of the reliability of the available animal
and clinical data. 238 The differences between the board and Upjohn concerned whether it was legitimate to extrapolate the animal data 239 and
whether the clinical studies, which did not indicate that the drug caused
2 40
cancer, had biological significance.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS
The FDA expected the PBOI to increase the effectiveness and the
legitimacy of its decisions, 24 1 but not all of its expectations were met.
One anticipated benefit-a more expeditious process-did not materialize. The agency had underestimated the time and effort necessary to select PBOI members and to produce an initial decision.
Despite these problems, the PBOI can be a useful method of resolving cases presenting difficult issues of scientific judgment, particularly
when those issues generate significant public interest. In such cases, the
potential benefits of increased accuracy and legitimacy are likely to outweigh the costs associated with the PBOI. Further, the FDA can take
some steps to lower those costs and thereby make the PBOI a more attractive option.
The experience of the aspartame and depo-provera proceedings supports these conclusions. The proceedings can be analyzed according to
their three components: the pre-hearing, hearing, and post-hearing
stages.
A.

The Pre-HearingProcess.

The pre-hearing process has four stages. First, the FDA decides
whether to assent to a request for a PBOI. It then frames the issues the
board will decide. Third, the FDA selects the members of the PBOI.
Finally, the parties involved in the dispute participate in pre-hearing procedures, such as a pre-hearing conference.
1. Choice of the PBOI. The FDA evaluates requests for a PBOI
without the benefit of published standards.2 42 According to FDA regula238. See supra notes 36-51.
239. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing extrapolation).
240. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing biological significance).
241. See supra notes 113-32 and accompanying text.
242. In addition to a lack of standards, this stage may suffer from another problem. When a
third party objects to approval of a petition for a food additive and asks for a PBOI, the person
whose petition would be reviewed by the PBOI has no right to object to the use of that procedure.
Antibiotic Drugs: General, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,706, 51,711-12 (1976). This situation occurred in the
aspartame case, where the request for the PBOI was made by two third parties. See supra note 137-
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tions, a PBOI will be held when the "Commissioner concludes, as a matter of discretion, that it is in the public interest to hold a public hearing
24 3
before a Public Board of Inquiry."
When the procedures for the PBOI were adopted, one critic predicted that, because of the lack of standards, "the application of [the
PBOI procedures] is likely to be erratic and arbitrary." Further, he
noted that "[i]f there are no standards for the Commissioner's selection
of cases, its use will not create public confidence in the procedure." 244
Although not erratic, the FDA's actions have confirmed the need
for standards. In neither the aspartame nor the depo-provera case did
the agency indicate why it approved the request for a PBOI. 245 The
FDA has since denied other requests for a PBOI on the grounds that its
use will delay the regulatory process and that the administrative law
judge has had experience with the issues presented, even if they are scien-

tifically complex. 246 In the context of these cases, the agency's explana-

43 and accompanying text. The FDA told Searle, the company that requested the additive regulation, that it had no right to prevent the agency from choosing the PBOI procedure. Interview with
Robert Becker and Peter Safir, Counsel for Searle, Aspartame Hearing, in Washington, D.C. (June
25, 1985).
The FDA contends that its position is neither unfair nor unsound. The agency's intention is to
"carefully consider the views of a [manufacturer] about the most appropriate forum ... and [to
consider denying] a request for an alternative form of hearing if... such a procedure would prejudice the rights of [that person]." 41 Fed. Reg. 51,712 (1976). Further, the FDA correctly concludes
that a company like Searle, whose petition has been granted, has no statutory right to a hearing. The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) grants the right to a hearing only if the petition for an
additive regulation is denied. Id. As a result, the petitioning company has no right to block a
request for a PBOI by another party.
This potential unfairness could be decreased if the FDA would adopt a set of criteria that
specified when it would grant a request for a PBOI. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
One guideline that the FDA should adopt would indicate that a PBOI would not be granted if it
prejudiced the ability of a manufacturer to have a fair and accurate hearing.
243. 21 C.F.R. § 13.1(a) (1985).
244. Thompson, Public Hearings-A View From The Bar, 32 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 312, 314
(1977).
245. See Aspartame: Ruling on Objections and Notice of Hearing Before a Public Board of
Inquiry, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,716, 31,716-19 (1979) (FDA granted a PBOI for aspartame without explanation); Depo-Provera Hearing on Proposal to Refuse Approval of Supplemental New Drug Application, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,274, 44,274-76 (1979) (FDA ordered a PBOI for depo-provera without
explanation).
246. See, e.g., Decision Denying Request for a Public Board of Inquiry on the Proposed Withdrawal of Cyclandelate (Cyclospasmol), Doc. No. 84N-0168 (1985). In this decision, the commissioner noted that:
[T]he issues presented by this proceeding are suitable for resolution by a formal evidentiary
hearing ....
This form of hearing has worked well in previous hearings involving the
application of the regulatory requirements for adequate and well-controlled studies... to
particular drugs. Many of these hearings have involved difficult and complex issues.
Through these hearings, the Administrative Law Judge has developed experience in handling the medical and legal issues presented by drug efficacy hearings that would be diffi-
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tions appear reasonable, 247 but there have been informal indications that
the FDA intends to reject all PBOI requests because of its experiences in
the aspartame and depo-provera cases. 248 If the agency has reached such
a policy decision, it has done so without the benefit of public input and
without publicly acknowledging its position.
Developing guidelines by which requests for a PBOI would be
granted or denied would yield four benefits. First, the FDA would be
able to consider carefully the benefits and costs of the PBOI and to obtain public input concerning them. Second, adopting criteria would encourage applicants to request the PBOI in appropriate cases. A third
advantage is that those who applied for a PBOI would be protected to
some extent against arbitrary agency action.2 49 Finally, such criteria
would enhance public confidence in the procedure.
2. Formulationof the Issues.

Once the FDA has decided to use

the PBOI procedure, it specifies what questions, or "charges," the panel
is to address. Critics have contended that there were two problems with

250
the agency's choice of issues in the aspartame and depo-provera cases.

One objection is that a PBOI should not be assigned the responsibility to
cult to match in any alternative forum ....
Finally, establishing and conducting a Public
Board of Inquiry... would cause unwarranted delay ....
Id. at 2-3.
247. The FDA has been particularly concerned about delay because the requests for PBOIs have
all been made in cases where the agency wants to remove drugs from the market in light of the lack
of evidence that they are effective. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127. The drugs that
the FDA wants to remove from the market were approved by the agency before there was a statutory requirement that a manufacturer prove a drug was effective to gain approval. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(1) (1982) (requiring persons submitting applications for drug approval to disclose "full
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether... such drug is effective in use");
Limiting Physician Freedom, supra note 32, at 803 (FDCA as interpreted by FDA requires submission of information from which FDA can gauge a drug's effectiveness); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.1(10) (1984) (requiring that applications for new drug approval contain "full reports of adequate preclinical tests by all methods reasonably applicable to a determination of the safety and
effectiveness of the drug under consideration"). Because Congress made the efficacy requirement
retroactive, the issue in these cases is whether the manufacturer now has adequate evidence of efficacy. The FDA has a legitimate interest in attempting to remove them as soon as possible because
the drugs remain on the market during the pendency of the hearing process. For a short history of
the effectiveness requirement, see J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 285-316 (2d ed. 1985).
248. Stribling Interview, supra note 129; Interview with Linda Horton, Attorney, FDA, in
Washington, D.C. (June 24, 1985) [hereinafter Horton Interview]. The agency's dissatisfaction with
the PBOI apparently is based on the difficulty of obtaining persons to serve on the panel and the
length of time needed before a board reaches its decision. These problems are considered infra notes
276-300, 362-78 and accompanying text.
249. Cf Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx. L. REV. 703, 705 (1974)
(suggesting efficacy of rulemaking procedure in regulating police activities).
250. See infra notes 254-55, 262-65 and accompanying text.
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make "regulatory" judgments. 251 Second, because the FDA inevitably
seems to assign it regulatory judgments, the PBOI is of doubtful
utility.252

The aspartame and depo-provera PBOIs were required to make
both "scientific" and "regulatory" judgments. 2 53 Professor Vincent
Brannigan has recommended that the FDA submit only "scientific questions" to a PBOI.25 4 He doubts that the structure and makeup of a
PBOI qualify it to make "regulatory decisions," because scientists lack
the training or experience to analyze the policy questions involved in

such issues.

255

Although Professor Brannigan is correct in stating that scientists do

not necessarily have any expertise concerning the resolution of issues of
regulatory judgment, 256 it does not follow that the FDA should avoid
submitting such issues to a PBOI. There are several reasons for allowing

the PBOI to consider such issues. Although scientists do not necessarily
have expertise in those matters, individual scientists-based on their ex-

periences with other regulatory matters-might have significant insights
to offer. In addition, regulatory judgments require an appreciation of the
2 57
nature of scientific judgments and their relationship to regulation.
251. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
253. Some judgments were "scientific" because their resolution required the application of scientific knowledge and experience. For example, one issue was whether the ingestion of aspartame may
induce brain tumors in rats. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. To answer this, the board
had to evaluate the scientific reliability of the rat studies. See supra notes 27-56 and accompanying
text (description of judgmental nature of evaluation of scientific evidence). Other judgments were
"regulatory" because they required the application of legal or policymaking knowledge or experience. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text. For example, one charge to the board was to
determine whether aspartame should be approved for use in foods in light of the scientific evidence.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text. This decision, which involved an application of the
FDA's statutory standards of "safety," was clearly regulatory in character. See supra notes 46-51
and accompanying text.
254. Brannigan, The First FDA Public Board of Inquiry: The Aspartame Case, in LAW AND
SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 201. He therefore approves of the aspartame board's
charge to determine whether the additive caused brain tumors in rats. Id. at 184, 201.
255. Id. at 184-85, 188-89. Thus he disapproves of the fact that the aspartame board was asked
to determine whether aspartame should be allowed for use in foods. The same conclusion was
reached in Note, The FDA's Public Board of Inquiry and the Aspartame Decision, 58 IND. LJ. 627,
639 (1983) ("[The aspartame board] was required to make the legal determination of whether aspartame should be approved for marketing instead of... deciding to what extent, if any, aspartame
is harmful.").
256. See McGarity, supra note 37, at 747-48 ("Scientists may decide a policy question one way
for purposes of scientific analysis, while regulators may resolve it in an entirely different fashion for
purposes of implementing their statutory mandates.").
257. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Scientists can help understand that interrelationship. 258 Furthermore,
because the PBOI is used in lieu of a formal evidentiary hearing, its legitimacy depends in part on offering participants the opportunity to comment on any relevant issue, including policy questions. Finally, because

the PBOI's decision is only a recommendation, the commissioner will
accept the PBOI's regulatory judgments only if the board can marshal
persuasive reasons for them. If necessary, the commissioner can also

hold a separate hearing to hear the individual views of participants con-

259
cerning specific regulatory issues.
When the FDA submits a regulatory matter to a PBOI, it should
ask the board two broad questions. First, it should ask the board to de-

termine the probability that a chemical is safe in light of all the relevant
evidence. In this way, the board will reach an overall scientific judgment
that requires it to consider its answers to the other charges and, because

scientific evaluations normally consist of probabilistic determinations,

260

to respond in terms that scientists will find familiar. The second broad

question the board should consider involves what action is justified by
the board's conclusion concerning the probability of harm. This approach separates the question of scientific judgment, which concerns the

probability of harm, from the regulatory question, which concerns the
261
action the FDA ought to take.

Nancy Buc, a former FDA general counsel, has argued that the
PBOI has little practical benefit because its expertise is significantly, if

not entirely, restricted to issues involving scientific judgment. 262 She
contends that the "government cannot be informed solely by science,

although it cannot govern without science. ' 263 Her reason is that health
and safety questions are too often matters of regulatory judgment. According to Buc, "there are so many more [issues besides issues of science

judgment] that ought to go into the business of governing, that a PBOI
258. The... need for scientific analysis ... goes beyond the simple assembly and interpretation of existing data ....
Beyond this, scientific expertise is necessary to recognize the
need for new data accumulation to anticipate emerging issues, to point to possible or probable implications of new courses of action or changes of circumstance, to interpret for
various audiences the scientific and technical content of political issues, and to provide
access to decision makers to the best and latest technical information. . . . This is the
content of ... policy-centered and decision-oriented science ....
Grobstein, supra note 105, at 129-30.
259. See 21 C.F.R. § 12.125(f) (1985) (commissioner may invite participants who appeal an
initial decision to file briefs or make oral presentations).
260. See Mashaw, An Overview: Two Models ofRegulatory Decision Making, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 17-18.

261. Id. at 18; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS
FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 151 (1983).
262. Buc, Comment, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 206.
263. Id.
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winds up as too small a piece of what the total process ought to be
about." 264 Similar criticisms have been made of the science court
2 65
proposal.
These critics, however, underestimate the value of the PBOI. Even
if it is not practical in the vast majority of the FDA's cases, some cases
present significant and difficult issues of scientific judgment. In the case
of aspartame, for example, the agency was asked to decide the safety of a
food additive that would be widely used by the American public. 266 Public interest in the issue was strong because the FDA had already removed
two other artificial sweeteners from the market because they were allegedly unsafe. 267 The depo-provera case generated the same degree of public interest because the drug had been approved as a contraceptive by
2 68
almost every other country in the world.
In these circumstances, the FDA gains two advantages from the
PBOI process. The first is the opportunity to have a panel of experts
analyze issues requiring scientific judgment. This may increase the accuracy of the decisionmaking process, 269 even if the panel can offer no par270
ticular assistance to the agency on issues of regulatory judgment.
Moreover, this advantage is present even if the FDA ultimately disagrees
with the PBOI; to overrule the panel, the commissioner must be able to
rebut the board's conclusions. Thus, the PBOI forces the FDA to take a
"hard look" at the validity of the agency's position. 27 1 Moreover, the
participation of experts who are independent of the agency enhances the
legitimacy of the agency's decisionmaking process. 272 If the FDA is willing to subject its decisions to this type of strict scrutiny, public confidence in agency decisionmaking should increase. Because the board's
written decision and the transcript of its hearing are available for judicial
review, 273 the agency must have reasonable grounds for overruling the
274
board's initial decision.
264. Id.
265. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
269. See infra notes 320-46 and accompanying text.
270. The panel, however, may be able to offer some assistance on these issues as well. See supra
notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
271. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 7.5.2 (description of "hard
look" review by federal courts).
272. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 391-98 and accompanying text.
274. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 7.3, at 358 (findings of hearing
body are part of record that courts use to review agency decisions).
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Although the PBOI can help resolve regulatory issues, it is more

useful for resolving scientific disputes. The FDA should consider this

275
when it develops criteria to determine when a PBOI should be used.

Cases that involve only regulatory issues probably are unsuitable for a
PBOI. In those cases, the costs associated with a PBOI will probably
exceed the benefits.
3.

Selection of Board Members. After the FDA specifies the is-

sues a PBOI will decide, it selects the board's members from the participants' nominees. 2 76 Two aspects of this stage that require evaluation are,

first, and most significantly, the delay caused by the difficulty of finding
qualified scientists to serve as board members and, second, the belief of
some commentators that the nomination process is potentially unfair and
inconsistent with the purpose of the PBOI.

a. Identifying qualified board members. The difficulty of finding
qualified board members significantly delayed the depo-provera hearing,
the appointment process for which took over two years. 277 It is impossible to measure the delay in the approval of aspartame that is attributable
to the selection process because, after the first two stages, the FDA
stayed the proceeding for over three years while it investigated the au278
thenticity of Searle's test data.

Finding persons qualified to serve is time-consuming for a number
of reasons. Board members must pass the FDA's strict conflict-of-interest rules. 279 These rules exclude many experts who worked previously
for the company whose product is the subject of the hearing or who pub-

lished papers in which they took a position on some issue relevant to the
hearing.280 In addition, only a limited number of persons have the skills
275. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text (recommendation that FDA establish criteria for use of PBOI).
276. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
277. The depo-provera hearing was announced in July 1979. Depo-Provera Hearing on Proposal to Refuse Approval of Supplemental New Drug Application, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,274 (1979). The
board was not established, however, until September 1981. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 39,638.
278. See supra notes 14547 and accompanying text.
279. See 21 C.F.R. § 13.10(a) (1985) ("All members of a Board are... subject to the conflict of
interest rules applicable to special Government employees."); see generally REVIEW PANEL ON
NEW DRUG REGULATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT:

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON STANDING ADVISORY COMMITEES OF THE BUREAU OF

DRUGS, FDA 10-17 (1977) (summarizing FDA policy on conflicts of interest among advisory committee members).
280. Conflict-of-interest problems were prominent in both the aspartame and depo-provera
cases. In the aspartame cases, Dr. Olney objected to the inclusion of Dr. Vernon Young on the
PBOI because Young had coauthored articles with Searle researchers about chemicals other than
aspartame. The commissioner dismissed the objection as being untimely. See Brannigan, supra note
254, at 186. In the depo-provera case, Upjohn objected to the inclusion of Dr. Paul Stolle, who had
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and scientific expertise that a PBOI requires. 281 These include the ability
to write an initial decision that is understandable to nonscientists, the

capacity to communicate effectively with lawyers and other nonscientists,
the management skills to conduct a hearing, an interest in dealing with
numerous details, and the willingness to make difficult decisions in controversial matters. 282 A final problem is that many qualified persons are
unwilling to serve because of the time commitment. 283 Board members
must read relevant FDA documents and scientific articles, 28 4 participate
in a hearing that lasts several days, 2 85 and prepare an initial decision that
2 86
can be of considerable length and complexity.
Several steps could be taken to facilitate the selection of board mem-

bers.

For example, the FDA could mitigate the conflict-of-interest

problems by relying more on government scientists. The commissioner,
who has the right to choose the chairperson, could select a government
scientist for that position. 287 Also, invitations to serve on the PBOI
should come from the commissioner or other high-ranking agency officials, thus indicating the importance of this service. Personal intervention of this type might convince reluctant nominees to serve. Finally, the

agency could make the position more attractive by making board service
less time-consuming. The FDA should authorize board members to hire
the equivalent of "law clerks," offer the board clerical support for the
preparation of written decisions, and institute record management procedures to allow more efficient access to documents.2 88 Further, PBOIs
been an expert witness in a tort action that concerned contraceptives. To solve the objection, Dr.
Stolle agreed to recuse himself from certain issues in the hearing. Copp and Campbell Interview,
supra note 127.
281. In the aspartame case, the FDA, because of the difficulty in finding qualified persons, found
it necessary to select two persons from the same institution. Both Dr. Vernon Young and Dr. Walle
Dauta were from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Interview with Marsha Gardner,
Counsel for the Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, FDA, Aspartame Hearing, in Washington, D.C. (June 24, 1985) [hereinafter Gardner Interview].
282. Becker and Safir Interview, supra note 156; Stribling Interview, supra note 129; Telephone
interview with Robert Temple, Director of Drug Research, FDA (July 1, 1985) [hereinafter Temple
Interview].
283. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127; Interview with Beverly Rothstein, Counsel
for Aspartame PBOI, in Washington, D.C. (June 26, 1985) [hereinafter Rothstein Interview].
284. Rothstein Interview, supra note 283.
285. See supra notes 151, 214-15 and accompanying text.
286. The depo-provera initial decision, for example, is over two hundred pages long. PBOI Report, supra note 200; see infra notes 364, 374-78 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of
writing initial decision).
287. See 21 C.F.R. § 13.10(c) (1985). The Center for Drugs or the Center for Food Additives
could also nominate government scientists. See id. §§ 13.10(a),(b); see generally supra note 14 (procedures for selection of board members). Many government scientists, however, may be as busy as
their private counterparts and therefore would also be unwilling to serve. Other government scientists may lack the necessary qualifications and professional stature to serve.
288. See infra notes 377-78 and accompanying text.
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can reduce their own responsibilities. For example, participants could be

required to file pre-hearing briefs and written statements of their testimony to assist the board in evaluating the evidence. Moreover, boards
could rely to a greater extent on their FDA-appointed legal advisor to
28 9
formulate and write the PBOI's decision.
Even if these steps are taken, the FDA will continue to have some

difficulty in attracting board members. As a result, it is unlikely that the
PBOI process can be used very often. This suggests that the FDA ought
to restrict use of the PBOI to cases involving difficult issues of scientific
judgment that are of significant interest to the public.
For this limited number of cases, however, the FDA should be able
to recruit the necessary assistance. Moreover, the occasional use of the

PBOI may be sufficient to handle the number of controversies for which
290
the procedure is appropriate.

b. Selecting board members. Some commentators have expressed
concern about the FDA's method of choosing board members. 2 91 Critics

have noted that the commissioner can avoid choosing anyone nominated
by the petitioner. 292 Only one board member is chosen from the com-

bined nominations of the petitioner and the FDA division that will par289. Id. The FDA could take another action to improve the selection process and other aspects
of the pre-hearing stage. To some degree, the delay took place because no one person was in charge
of the PBOI process in the same manner that an ALT is in charge of a formal hearing. The general
counsel's office was responsible for negotiating the charges to the board; the commissioner's office
was responsible for selecting board members. This division of responsibility hampered both activities because no one was in a position to accelerate the process. As a solution, the commissioner
should appoint a chairperson as soon as a PBOI is chosen as the appropriate hearing method. The
chairperson, along with the attorney-advisor for the board, would then be in a position to ensure a
more efficient process. The chairperson could act in the same manner as an ALT-managing the
case and threatening to sanction any party who is dilatory.
290. The FDA has been able to resolve almost all controversies about new drugs as administrative matters. Dean Richard Merrill and Professor Jerry Mashaw report that the "agency and the
applicant generally reach agreement on conditions for the release of a drug for which a formal NDA
has been filed; when the agency appears unlikely to be persuaded, the applicant typically never
submits a completed NDA." J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 247, at 288. As a result, the
FDA has held only three formal hearings on a refusal to approve a new drug since 1962.
Other formal evidentiary hearings have been held to determine whether drugs approved by the
agency prior to 1962 can remain on the market. These hearings are necessary to determine whether
drugs marketed prior to 1962 meet the additional requirement that a manufacturer must establish
the efficacy, as well as the safety, ofits drugs for FDA approval. Id. at 288-90. The FDA, however,
has often avoided these hearings on the ground that the manufacturer failed to provide any evidence
that its product was effective. Id. at 290; see generally supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
Further, it is unlikely that this second type of hearing would be suitable for a PBOI because these
cases rarely involve significant issues of scientific judgment. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
291. See Thompson, supra note 244, at 314-15; Note, supra note 255, at 644.
292. The commissioner selects one board member from the nominations submitted by the petitioner and the FDA staff involved in the hearing. A second person is chosen from the nomination
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ticipate in the hearing.2 93 If the petitioner is opposing a decision by the
agency to approve a product, the petitioner and the FDA division will
have antagonistic interests. Failure to choose a nominee of the petitioner
in this situation could thus threaten the legitimacy of the process. The
solution would be to change the nomination process so that the commissioner selects one nominee submitted by those supporting the FDA's ac294
tion, one from those opposing the action, and a third of his choice.
Another source of concern is the belief that a nomination process is
inappropriate for this type of hearing body. By using this process, the
FDA allows participants to recommend persons they believe will support
their position. 295 One commentator is concerned that the procedure will
be "open to controversy" because it "places potential partisans in positions that should be [held by] neutral [persons]. ' 296 The commentator's
solution is to have an independent body, such as the National Academy
297
of Sciences, select the board members.
This commentator's premise is unsound. The participants' role in
selecting the PBOI's members enhances the board's legitimacy, as it does
in the case of arbitration boards.298 Further, the FDA's stringent conflict-of-interest rules sufficiently guarantee the neutrality of board members because they exclude anyone who has apparently prejudged the
outcome of the controversy. 299 Moreover, administrative decisionmakers
are traditionally not disqualified because of their views on broad policy
matters, as opposed to prejudgment of particular facts. 3°° It is entirely
consistent with this traditional approach that, in the context of the
PBOI, a party is free to nominate a scientist whose general views about
scientific controversies appear favorable to the party's position.
4. Other Pre-HearingProcedures. Four other aspects of the prehearing stage require brief examination: whether parties should have additional discovery rights, whether the use of a pre-hearing conference
should be required, whether the role of lawyers should be deemphasized,
and whether the PBOI creates unacceptable administrative burdens.
list prepared by the other participants in the proceeding. The commissioner, in his discretion,
chooses the third person, who is the chairperson. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
294. See Thompson, supra note 244, at 314-15 (suggesting this solution).
295. Becker and Safir Interview, supra note 156; Note, supra note 255, at 644.
296. Note, supra note 255, at 644.
297. Id. at 644-45.
298. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 542 (1976) (discussing arbitration procedures).

299. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
300. See R. PIERCE, S.SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 9.2.2 (administrators should not
be disqualified for their views on broad policy questions).
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Existing pre-hearing procedures include two discovery requirements. Submissions for the hearing record are filed with the FDA before
the hearing, and parties receive either a copy or a notification of such
filings. 30 1 Parties are also required to specify the nature of the arguments
they intend to present, and to identify their witnesses and the evidence on
30 2
which they intend to rely.
Some commentators would have the FDA consider whether additional discovery procedures, such as written interrogatories, would be
useful. 303 Based on the FDA's experience in the aspartame and depoprovera cases, however, additional discovery appears unnecessary. In
neither case did it appear that any party was disadvantaged or surprised
by arguments from other parties. Disputes of this type concern the evaluation of scientific studies that are publicly available from the agency or
in the literature;30 4 as a result, the FDA's requirement that parties indicate the evidence on which they intend to rely is sufficient to avoid unfair
surprise.
In both the aspartame and depo-provera cases, the boards went beyond required discovery and held pre-hearing conferences. 30 5 These conferences were used to allocate time for each presentation, to consider the
other procedures to be used in the hearing, and to emphasize the board's
desire to avoid an adversarial proceeding. 30 6 Those involved believed the
30 7
conferences contributed to the success of the hearing process.
Some observers are disappointed that lawyers played such a prominent role in the pre-hearing process, believing that it detracted from the
"scientific" nature of the proceedings and contributed to the delays that
occurred. 30 8 Other observers believe the participation of attorneys is essential if a hearing is to be well-run and well-organized. 30 9 Lawyers in
each case helped negotiate the issues that would be heard by the
board,3 10 established the procedures that the board would use, 3 11 submit301. 21 C.F.R. § 13.20 (1985).
302. Id. § 13.25.
303. See, eg., Koch, Discovery in Rulemaking, 1977 DUKE L.J. 295, 345 (advocating the broad-

ening of information gathering procedures).
304. See supra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
305. See Depo-Provera Sterile Aqueous Suspension; Notice of Prehearing Conference on Propo.
sal to Refuse Approval of Supplemental New Drug Application, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,470 (1982); Rothstein Interview, supra note 283.
306. Rothstein Interview, supra note 283; Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
307. Rothstein Interview, supra note 283; Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
308. Hutt Interview, supra note 122; cf. Brannigan, supra note 254, at 182-84 (lawyers involved
in aspartame PBOI framed the issues so that a legal rather than scientific judgment would be made).
309. See, eg., Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127.
310. See Brannigan, supra note 254, at 182-84 (discussing events that framed the issues for aspartame hearings).
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ted documents and prepared witnesses, 312 and monitored the compliance
3 13
of participants with the procedural regulations.
There is no evidence that the legal maneuvering that occurred during the pre-trial process caused significant delay. Furthermore, because
lawyers are trained to orchestrate the presentation of evidence, their participation probably helped to organize the PBOI process. Finally, it is
doubtful that the FDA could limit the participation of lawyers in the pretrial process without discouraging the use of the PBOI or possibly infringing the due process rights of the parties.3 14
A final concern is that a PBOI involves "an administrative
nightmare. ' 315 Indeed, a PBOI is costly to administer. These costs include the transaction and salary costs of hiring the board members as
special employees of the agency, 31 6 the transaction and logistical costs of
a PBOI hearing,31 7 and the cost of assigning one or more lawyers to the
3 18
board as counsel on legal and procedural issues.
In light of these expenses, the FDA might use "cost" as one of its
criteria for determining whether to convene a PBOI. At the same time,
the agency should be able to decrease its transaction costs as it becomes
more experienced in administering a PBOI. For example, one cause of
high transaction costs has been the inexperience of personnel in the com3 19
missioner's office in managing PBOI-type meetings.
The pre-hearing stage facilitates an orderly and effective hearing,
but at the cost of considerable delay. Many of the causes for the delay
can be remedied, but finding board members will continue to be a problem. The advantages of the PBOI must be weighed against that
disadvantage.
311. See, eg., Letter from J.C. Stucki, Vice President for Pharmaceutical Research, Upjohn
Company, to Linda Quinones, Chief of FDA Documents Branch (October 15, 1981) (discussing
procedures and timetables for depo-provera PBOI); Letter from Diane Silberstein, Counsel to the
National Women's Health Network, to Dr. Judith Weisz, Chairperson, Depo-Provera PBOI (October 26, 1982) (discussing clarification of procedures).
312. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127.
313. See Brannigan, supra note 254, at 192-94 (description of Upjohn's objections to Dr. Olney's
submissions). The "policing" function even included negotiations concerning whether or not the
depo-provera hearing could be videotaped. See Letter from Mark Novitch, M.D., FDA Deputy
Commissioner, to William B. Schultz, Counsel to the Public Citizen Litigation Group (Jan. 5, 1983)
(denying appeal from ruling that no videotaping could take place).
314. See generally R. PIERCE, S.SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 6.3 (discussing due
process clause as source of procedural requirements).
315. Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
316. See 21 C.F.R. § 13.10(e) (1985).
317. Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
318. See 21 C.F.R. § 13.15(b) (1985) (administrative support will only be provided by the offices
of the commissioner and the chief counsel for FDA).
319. Horton Interview, supra note 248.
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The Hearing Process.

1. Quality of the Process. The aspartame and depo-provera hearings were both noteworthy for the depth and sophistication of the scientific presentations and discussions. One commentator has called the
aspartame hearing "a model scientific debate" in which "[t]he issues were
presented sharply. '320 Participants were particularly impressed that the
board members were familiar enough with the evidence that they could
321
correct the misstatements of witnesses.
This aspect of the PBOI distinguishes it from the FDA's other
methods of obtaining scientific input. The PBOIs have been more successful in producing a thorough review of the issues than most advisory
committees have been, and for a number of reasons. Witnesses before an
advisory committee often present only background information. 322 Because these presentations precede the FDA's decision, they may also fail
to address issues that become important later in the decisionmaking process. 323 Furthermore, many advisory committee members are not wellbriefed on the documents or scientific literature relevant to the presentations. As a result, the witnesses and committee members do not interact
as productively as in PBOIs. 324 PBOI members are also likely to have
expertise in the specific matters under discussion; advisory committee
members, in contrast, are likely to be generalists because they are picked
to represent a broader range of expertise. 325 In addition, advisory committee meetings only last for several hours, 326 thereby limiting the attention that can be given to an issue. Finally, advisory committee members
sometimes view their role as representing the interests of some constituency, such as a particular group of physicians. 32 7 Board members, in
328
contrast, have been praised for their impartiality.
320. Brannigan, supra note 254, at 194. Another commentator concluded that "[t]he board was
successful in crystalizing and narrowing the issues and brought independent expert assessment into
the decisionmaking process." Note, supra note 255, at 636-37.
321. See, eg., Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
322. Temple Interview, supra note 282.
323. Id.
324. See USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES, supra note 100, at 81 (advisory commit-

tee members often are prepared inadequately for meetings); see also Gardner Interview, supra note
281; Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
325. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Hoffman, The FDA's New Forms of
PublicHearing-ChoosingAmong the Alternatives, 32 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 330, 337 (1977) (advisory committee is ad hoc in character); Becker & Safir Interview, supra note 156; Sobel Interview,
supra note 227.
326. USE OF STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEES, supra note 100, at 97-100.
327. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127.
328. Temple Interview, supra note 282.
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The differences identified between PBOIs and advisory committees
affect the type of advice the FDA ultimately receives. In the advisory
committee setting, committee members give the agency their impressions
or opinions based on a brief review of the available evidence and on their
own familiarity with the controversy. 329 Moreover, the results of advisory committee meetings are usually reported in the form of minutes kept
by an FDA employee or in other documents that briefly summarize the
disposition of a matter.330 These reports may not identify clearly either
the questions the FDA posed or the specific answers the committee formulated and the basis for those answers. 3 31 Members of the PBOI, in
contrast, offer the FDA an expert assessment of the relevant evidence in
an accountable manner-the PBOI scientists are required to defend their
judgments in a written explanation and evaluation of the relevant scien332
tific evidence.
Some of the disadvantages of advisory committees could be overcome if the FDA raised the standard of performance for committee
members. 333 The advisory committee, however, might still lack specialists in the particular fields involved in a controversy. Moreover, participants are unlikely to submit to an advisory committee hearing unless the
334
FDA requires separation of functions and prohibits ex parte contacts.
Those restrictions apply to a PBOI, but they do not currently apply to an
335
advisory committee hearing.
Many of the advantages of a PBOI may also be obtained by consulting an institution like the NAS-NRC. As one commentator recently reported: "The NAS has a unique status as an independent,
congressionally chartered, and prestigious institution with a good record
in providing advice on science and technology to the federal government,
including advice on regulatory processes. ' 336 As a general matter, however, NAS-NRC committees do not use the same type of hearing process
329. USE OF STANDING ADVISORY CoMMITTEEs, supra note 100, at 80-81, 104-07.

330. Id. at 109-13.
331. Id. at 113. For example, the chairperson of the depo-provera PBOI reported that she was
unable to determine the basis for advisory committee recommendations concerning depo-provera
from the available documentation.

332. 21 C.F.R. §§ 13.30(e),(i) (1985).
333. See HEW FINAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 57-59 (committees should assign certain matters as "primary reviews" to individual members, who would prepare questions about data received
prior to the meetings).
334. See generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 9.3 (discussing ex
parte contacts and informal rulemaking).
335. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 13.15 (1985) (PBOI separation of functions and ex parte prohibitions) with 21 C.F.R. § 14.29 (1985) (establishing advisory committee hearing procedures, which do
not include requirement of separation of functions or prohibition on ex parte contacts).
336. Grobstein, supra note 105, at 133.
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as a PBOI. 337 NAS-NRC review is also more expensive than a PBOI. 3 38
Finally, through a PBOI the FDA obtains expert, independent advice as
part of its own hearing process; the NAS-NRC option would not serve
339
the same purpose.

A PBOI has several advantages over formal evidentiary hearings.
First, PBOI members are more likely to know and understand the scientific evidence before the hearing begins. 340 Unlike an AL, board members need to prepare for only one hearing, and their professional careers
have been spent reading and understanding this type of evidence. As a
result, the board members are better able to question witnesses, particularly on ambiguities or limitations in the data.341
In addition, outstanding scientists are likely to participate as witnesses in a PBOI because it is nonadversarial; many scientists are unwilling to testify in a formal evidentiary hearing because of the adversarial
nature of that process. 3 42 Scientists prefer to operate according to traditional scientific methods, which stress collegiality. 343
A third advantage of the PBOI is that it is more likely than an adversarial proceeding to examine ill-defined issues. Many scientists believe that there is a tendency for lawyers, and for traditional hearings, to
3
focus only on questions that can be clearly delineated. "
Fourth, a PBOI is more likely than an ALJ to consider whether the
FDA has a sound scientific basis for its actions. Most persons who challenge FDA actions believe they have little or no chance of prevailing
before the ALJ because he reportedly has never decided against the
agency. 345 One reason for this pattern is that the agency takes actions
that lead to a hearing only when it believes it has a strong legal case.
Because the ALJ has a legal orientation, rather than a scientific orienta346
tion, the agency has always prevailed.
A PBOI has several potential limitations, however, that must be bal337. See id. at 118-22, 127 (describing the hearing process used in NAS-NRC committees).
338. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
340. Rothstein Interview, supra note 283.
341. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127; see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying
text.
342. Gardner Interview, supra note 281; Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
343. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 841 (scientific community routinely subjects
results and methods to both formal and informal review).
344. Temple Interview, supra note 282.
345. Becker and Safir Interview, supra note 156; Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127;
Hutt Interview, supra note 122.
346. Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127.
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333

anced against these advantages. 347 The ability of board members to conduct a hearing depends on their level of expertise. Thus, one
disadvantage of a PBOI is that its success depends on the FDA's ability
34 8
to recruit able scientists as board members.
A second disadvantage is that a board's expertise and the issues

before it may be mismatched. In the aspartame case, for example, board
members were chosen for their expertise in neurotoxicity. 349 After the
board members were selected, the FDA asked the PBOI to investigate an
issue that required a different type of expertise. 350 This problem could be
minimized, however, by hiring persons with the necessary expertise as
3 51
consultants to the board.
A final limitation is that the commissioner may not appreciate the
full extent of the debate that occurred during a PBOI hearing from the
post-hearing documents submitted by the parties or from other parts of
the hearing record. Because the quality of this debate is one of the important advantages of a PBOI, the commissioner should consider attending the hearing itself. In this way, the commisioner could ask questions,
take part in the dialogue, and obtain a more complete and accurate un352
derstanding of the issues.
347. Some may argue that the PBOI process is a less desirable alternative for the very reason
that it is nonadversarial, and that an opportunity to challenge the admissibility of evidence is essential for preventing erroneous information from entering the record, while cross-examination is required to alert the decisionmaker to errors in testimony. One response is that parties could be given
expanded rights to cross-examine witnesses and object to the inclusion of irrelevant or immaterial
evidence. Adversarial procedures are not necessary for a PBOI, though, because board members are
experts, with specific knowledge about a particular controversy. Thus, they are more likely than an
ALJ to recognize incorrect information. Moreover, scientists are trained to identify mistakes and
biases in each other's work; the scientific method is based on a tradition in which each scientist's
work is subject to formal and informal review by other scientists. When the members of a PBOI
conduct a hearing, they are engaged in the same process. Finally, there may be little practical difference between a PBOI and a formal hearing in terms of the types of evidence admitted because AL~s
commonly allow most types of evidence to be admitted to avoid possible reversal.
348. The FDA has faced some difficulty in recruiting qualified persons to serve on PBOIs. See
supra notes 277-90 and accompanying text.
349. The members of the aspartame panel were selected when the only issues that were to be
addressed concerned neurotoxicity; questions concerning aspartame's potential to cause brain tumors arose after the board had been selected. See Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at
38,286.
350. The board was asked to determine whether rats who were fed aspartame developed brain
tumors. Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159, at 39. The commissioner overruled the board
concerning its conclusions about the rat studies. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
Given that the commissioner found that some of the board's conclusions concerning the rat studies
contained methodological errors, see supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text, the board was
probably hampered by its lack of expertise. See Peck, Comment, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 209.
351. See 21 C.F.R. § 13.30(f) (1985) (board's authority to consult with experts).
352. Telephone interview with Richard Merrill, former FDA general counsel (Aug. 15, 1985).
Quite understandably, the commissioner might be reluctant to attend a PBOI because of its length.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1986:288

2. Flexibility of the Process. A PBOI "may consult with any person who it concludes may have information or views relevant to the is-

sues" during a hearing,353 and it may call a second hearing "if the
Chairman concludes that it is needed to fully and fairly present informa-

tion that cannot otherwise adequately be considered and to properly resolve the issues.

' 354

These features add to the board's flexibility,

allowing it to respond to any new scientific evidence that develops during
the hearing process, 355 and to obtain additional information concerning
3 56
issues that are not resolved in the first hearing.
3.

Open Nature of the Process. A final advantage of the PBOI

process is that it permits broad participation. In the depo-provera hearing, for example, over forty persons made presentations. These included

representatives of the World Health Organization, the International
Planned Parenthood Federation, the United States Agency for International Development, the Women's National Health Network, the Health

Research Group, the Institute for the Study of Medical Ethics, and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 357 Although there

were only a few nonparty participants in the aspartame proceeding, they
included scientists who voluntarily appeared because of their interest and
The aspartame hearing lasted three days, and the depo-provera hearing lasted five days. See supra
notes 151, 214 and accompanying text. An alternative would be to have direct communication between the board and the commissioner upon submission of the final decision. The time-commitment
problem might also be addressed by changing the nature of the PBOI. The FDA's rules currently
provide that a party entitled to a formal hearing can request instead a hearing before the commissioner. The commissioner could appoint independent scientists to assist him in the hearing process,
including the preparation of his decision. This combination of the PBOI process and the commissioner's final decision should be more efficient because it would eliminate one step in the hearing
process, decrease many of the administrative burdens that have delayed the PBOI process, and invite
a collegial dialogue between the commissioner and independent, expert scientists.
353. 21 C.F.R. § 13.30(f) (1985).
354. Id. § 13.30(e).
355. In the aspartame case, for example, a study suggesting that aspartame had neurotoxic
properties was completed after the FDA had selected the PBOI. The board solicited additional
submissions of data because these "new questions arose." See PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 3;
see also supra note 350 and accompanying text.
356. In the depo-provera case, for example, the board was presented with evidence of carcinomas in two monkeys that were given depo-provera. The carcinomas developed in a location where
such tumors were not known to occur spontaneously, which suggested that their development was
related to the drug. This inference was contradicted by testimony that another study had found a
spontaneous tumor in that unusual location. After the first hearing was completed, the board felt it
could not reach a decision without determining the validity of the second study. As a result, the
board hired a group of pathologists to verify whether the spontaneous tumor in the second study was
of the same type and in the same location as the tumors in depo-provera monkeys. Tile board
scheduled a second hearing to receive the report of the pathologists. See Depo-Provera Sterile
Aqueous Suspension; Time and Place of Second Hearing, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,910 (1983); Stribling
Interview, supra note 129.
357. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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expertise in the matter. 358 Based on these experiences, the PBOI appears
to offer a better forum than advisory committees or formal hearings for
broad-based nonparty participation.
FDA rules provide that any interested person may appear and make
a presentation before an advisory committee, a formal hearing, or a
PBOI. 359 The informal PBOI is particularly well-suited to receiving input from scientists and others. Participants need not retain a lawyer to
make a presentation, and the nonlegal nature of the hearing makes it less
intimidating. 360 Moreover, unlike a short advisory committee meeting, 36 1 the PBOI process can be long enough to accommodate even a
large number of participants. Because it convenes after the FDA has
reached a decision, a PBOI can scrutinize rather than merely recommend
a decision, and it is also likely to attract more public attention than an
advisory committee.
C.

The Post-HearingProcess.

The post-hearing process involves an initial decision by the PBOI
and a final decision by the commissioner. Three aspects of this process
should be examined: the time delay that occurs, the effect of the board's
inattention to traditional legal procedures, and the commissioner's standard of review.
1. Time Delays. The preparation of the initial decision has
caused delays in the PBOI process. Table II indicates the time periods
between the start of the PBOI hearing, the date of the initial decision,
362
and the date of the commissioner's decision (in the aspartame case).
The depo-provera board took a considerably longer time (twenty-one
months) to produce an initial decision than did the aspartame board
(nine months). Nevertheless, Searle regarded even that delay as inappropriate-shortly before the board issued its decision, the company had
363
filed suit to force the board to complete its decision.

358. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
359. 21 C.F.R. § 12.40 (1985); see USE OF STANDING COMMITTEES, supra note 100, at 103
(public interest representatives and individual consumers may address advisory committees if they
have notified the FDA in advance).
360. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
362. Commissioner's Final Decision, supra note 139, at 38,286.
363. Becker and Safir Interview, supra note 156.
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Table II - Time Delays
Depo-Provera

Aspartame

Date hearing started

January 1983

January 1980

Date of initial decision

October 1984

October 1980

Time elapsed

21 months

9 months

Date of final decision

July 1981

Total time elapsed

18 months

Several factors led to these delays. Board members held other fulltime positions with their own time-consuming responsibilities. Further,
with one exception, members had no one to assist them in preparing their
decision. 364 Board members were also geographically scattered and, as a
365
result, could meet only sporadically.
Difficulty in finding documents has also slowed the process. The
chairperson of the depo-provera board called this problem a
367
"nightmare. '366 The FDA files documents in the order received.
Although it gives each document a number, the agency has no cataloging
system or other means by which to retrieve documents efficiently.3 68 As
a result, a PBOI cannot be certain that it has reviewed all submissions
pertaining to any particular issue without examining all of the documents
369
filed. In the depo-provera case, these numbered into the thousands.
Moreover, the search for a specific document can be time-consuming.
For example, the depo-provera board found that the FDA had no index
of advisory committee minutes. The board therefore had to search all of
3 70
the minutes fied by the committee to locate the ones it wanted.
Besides these general problems, the delay in the depo-provera case
had three additional sources. The depo-provera board was asked to decide a broader array of issues than the aspartame board. 371 Moreover,
364. The depo-provera PBOI chairperson did have the assistance of a graduate student from her
institution. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 5. The time demands are aggravated by the fact that
the high quality scientists that the FDA seeks for the board are particularly busy. Cf supra notes
283-87 and accompanying text (scientists unwilling to serve on PBOIs because of time constraints).

365. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 5 n.3.
366. Telephone interview with Judith Weisz, M.D., chairperson of the depo-provera PBOI (August 15, 1985) (hereinafter Weisz Interview].
367. !a
368. Id.
369. See infra note 373 and accompanying text.
370. Weisz Interview, supra note 366.
371. Comparesupra notes 230-33 and accompanying text (depo-provera charges) with supranote
148 and accompanying text (aspartame charges).
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the FDA had been considering the depo-provera case for over eighteen
years before the board was convened. 372 As a result, there was a lengthy
administrative record for the board to consider, as well as an extensive
scientific literature. For example, the board reported that: "In September, 1983, when we began, the documents in the administrative record in
this matter occupied approximately 45 linear feet of shelf space. At the
time of the submission of our report, the documents occupy approxi373
mately 54 linear feet."
The scope of the depo-provera case is reflected in the length of the
initial decision, which covers nearly two hundred pages. 374 In contrast,
the aspartame initial decision is fifty pages long. 375 The other factor that
delayed the depo-provera board was the illness of one member, who was
376
unable to assist in writing the report.
Because of the peculiar problems faced by the depo-provera PBOI,
the time delay in the aspartame case may indicate more accurately the
length of time future PBOIs will need to prepare their decisions. Moreover, the FDA can take several steps to speed the process. The most
important change would be to authorize board members to hire graduate
students or others to serve the same function that law clerks serve for an
ALJ or trial judge. The FDA could also offer the board clerical support
or authorize board members to obtain it. Participants could be required
to file pre-hearing briefs, written statements of their testimony, and a
joint appendix listing the documents upon which they would rely. These
and similar requirements could help the board organize the issues and
evidence. 377 Furthermore, the FDA could institute record management
procedures that would improve access to documents. Finally, the
board's legal advisor, an FDA attorney, might take a more active role in
helping the board write its report, perhaps drafting part of the report
378
under board supervision.
Even if the FDA makes the improvements suggested here, the use of
a PBOI may cause some delay. Consequently, the potential time delay
should be one factor considered in determining whether to grant a request for a PBOI. The FDA should also consider whether a case
372. See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
373. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 4 n.2.

374. Id.
375. See Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159. The aspartame decision, however, is insufficiently documented. See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
376. PBOI Report, supra note 200, at 5 n.4, 181.
377. See Copp and Campbell Interview, supra note 127; Rothstein Interview, supra note 283.
378. The attorneys who advised the boards apparently played a limited role in preparing the
initial decisions. The decisions themselves were written entirely by the boards. Rothstein Interview,
supra note 283; Stribling Interview, supra note 129.
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presents so many unresolved issues that a PBOI would be as unwieldy as
it was in the depo-provera matter.
2. Inattention to Traditional Procedures. The aspartame PBOI
379
has been criticized for its disregard of traditional legal procedures.
The board's most significant oversight was its failure to provide any citations in its initial decision. 380 No one at the FDA anticipated that the
board would issue a decision without footnotes, while the board itself did
not consider the footnotes to be necessary. 3 81 The FDA had corrected
this problem by the time of the depo-provera board's initial decision by
382
informing the board of the need for supporting citations.
Professor Brannigan has argued that another problem is the absence
of an "appropriate, usable record" for the proceeding. 3 83 Although "the
office of the hearing clerk [at the FDA] maintains a reasonably efficient,
cumulative record of the entire proceeding ... it is impossible to determine what portion of the 162 volumes constitutes the hearing record."
Brannigan contrasts this situation to his experiences with adjudicatory
hearings at the Consumer Product Safety Commission, where "an appropriate, usable record was made and preserved. ' 384 This criticism, however, is not appropriately directed at the PBOI procedure, because the
FDA establishes the same type of record for both a PBOI and a formal
38 5
evidentiary hearing.
Professor Brannigan also objects that the FDA has failed to explain
why witnesses were not under oath, why slides used by some witnesses
during their testimony were not made part of the record, and why two
board members visited the Searle laboratories after the hearing was over
to view tissue samples stored there. 38 6 Concerning the last event, Brannigan notes that the observations of board members during their visit are
379. See, e.g., Brannigan, supra note 254, at 194-95, 199-200 (witnesses were not under oath,
slides used in presentations were not made part of record, and hearing record was not distinguished
from other documents); Buc, supra note 262, at 205 (by not following regular legal procedure, PBOI
created "utter mess" for potential litigants).
380. See Aspartame PBOI Decision, supra note 159.
381. Rothstein Interview, supra note 283.
382. Stribling Interview, supra note 130.
383. Brannigan, supra note 254, at 200.
384. Id. at 199-200.
385. The record for a PBOI consists of all FederalRegister notices, all written submissions, the
transcripts of all hearings, and the initial decision, including the documents it cites in support of its
conclusions. A record for a formal hearing consists of all of these documents and any other documentary evidence submitted during the hearing. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 13.40 (PBOI record) vith
id,
§§ 12.94, 12. 100 (formal hearing record). Because of its informal nature, the PBOI does not include
any procedure by which the board rules on the admissibility of evidence. See supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text.
386. Brannigan, supra note 254, at 194-95.
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"not evidence of record, unless their observations, as expressed in the
[initial decision], are evidence. ' 38 7 The FDA could easily remedy Professor Brannigan's complaints. Witnesses should be required to take
oaths, copies of slides used by witnesses should be included in the record,
and board members should be required to summarize their findings concerning any on-site visit for inclusion in the record. These changes
would improve the accountability of the board without interfering with
the PBOI process.
Even if these changes are made, however, Professor Brannigan and
others may still be unsatisfied. Their true objection to the PBOI process
appears to be that it does not include all of the procedures used in a
formal evidentiary hearing. Thus, some critics have objected to the lack
of an opportunity for cross-examination. 388 Similarly, Professor Brannigan objects that members of a PBOI have engaged in on-site inspection
from which the participants in the hearing process were absent. 38 9 As
previously noted, however, the traditional procedures of a formal hearing
process are unnecessary when scientific specialists are employed. 390 Selecting board members for their familiarity with both the specific subject
matter and the particular controversy being resolved sufficiently guarantees accurate decisionmaking.
3. AppropriateStandardof Review. The final question relevant at
this stage of the process is the proper scope of the commissioner's review
of PBOI decisions. In the traditional hearing process, if an agency and
an ALJ disagree with respect to a finding of fact, the agency's finding
receives deference on judicial review; the reviewing court considers the
ALl's findings only in determining whether the agency's finding is supported by the record as a whole.3 9 ' Some commentators have suggested
392
that the special status of the PBOI may require different treatment.
They argue that "the entire rationale for convening a board of experts
collapses if their opinion carries no more weight than that of an administrative law judge" 393 and that, "if an expert advisory group, such as the
board, is only given lip service, then utilization of the board becomes
merely a wasteful step in a repetitious process of regulation. ' 394 Further,
the lack of deference might discourage scientists from accepting appoint387. Id. at 195.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See supra note 347.
See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 347.
See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 7.3-1, at 358 (1985).
See Brannigan, supra note 254, at 197-99; Note, supra note 255, at 646-48.
Brannigan, supra note 254, at 198.
Note, supra note 255, at 647.
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ments to the board. Accordingly, these commentators propose that the
board's conclusions be given "the status of a jury finding, to be overturned only if no reasonable person could agree with the panel, ' 395 or
that the "factual determinations of the board should.., have a presump' 396
tion of validity with a clear error standard of review.
These suggestions, although meritorious, raise a problem of their
own. Congress has given the commissioner the responsibility to implement the FDCA, making the commissioner legally and politically responsible for the agency's actions. Consequently, the commissioner
should be free to reach a conclusion different than that found by the
PBOI if cogent reasoning supports that conclusion. Otherwise, the commissioner would have the responsibility, but not the practical authority,
to make decisions for the agency. Thus, the commissioner should not be
required to defer to the decisions of a PBOI. It is unlikely, moreover,
that the commissioner will give only "lip service" to the scientific judgments of a PBOI; as a practical matter, the board's scientific judgments
will normally receive deference. In most cases, the commissioner will
follow the board's recommendation because of the reputation of the
board members, their specific expertise concerning the matters in dispute, the quality of their arguments, and the recognition that the integrity of the PBOI process will be undermined by arbitrary treatment of
397
the board's conclusions.
Moreover, even if the commissioner does not defer to the board's
conclusions, the entire rationale of the PBOI does not "collapse." One
important advantage of the PBOI process is that it produces a hearing
record that fully and expertly delineates the issues to be decided.3 98 As a
result, the PBOI contributes to the decisionmaking process by helping
the commissioner appreciate the nature of the scientific issues. In cases
with complex scientific issues, the commissioner would value this aspect
of the PBOI process.
Finally, for cases in which the final FDA decision differs from the
board's scientific judgment, the commissioner could establish a procedural rule requiring the FDA to explain fully its reasons for rejecting the
board's judgment. In the aspartame case, for example, the commissioner
rejected the board's determination that the incidence of tumors in a control group of rats was inconsistent with the incidence of tumors that,
395. Brannigan, supra note 254, at 198.
396. Note, supra note 255, at 647 (footnote omitted).
397. Cf R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 8, § 7.5 (as a practical matter, degree
of deference given by federal courts varies with court's judgment whether deference is warranted by
agency's expertise, actions, and explanations).
398. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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according to the scientific literature, would occur spontaneously. The
commissioner found the board's interpretation of the scientific literature
unjustified. 399 The board had no special expertise concerning the scientific literature, because it was chosen for its expertise concerning neurotoxicity, not neuro-oncology. 4° ° In this situation, the commissioner
should have explained that, because of this mismatch between the dispute
and the board's expertise, no deference to their judgment was
appropriate.
Considered as a whole, the post-hearing process could work effectively. The depo-provera initial opinion indicates that PBOIs can produce decisions that exhaustively and rigorously consider the relevant
issues. Furthermore, except for the delay in producing initial decisions,
there are no significant problems at this stage of the process; the delay in
the depo-provera case may have been atypical. As has been suggested
here, moreover, the FDA has several options available to it for speeding
this stage of the process.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC BOARD OF INQUIRY

There has been considerable interest in the FDA's experiences with
the PBOI because the process differs from the traditional means by
which scientific input is obtained. 4° 1 The FDA's experiences justify further experimentation with this type of process, both at the FDA and at
other agencies.
A.

The PBOI Process at the FDA.

The FDA's experiences with the PBQI confirm the value of the "science court" idea for resolving issues of scientific judgment. 402 Its scientific seminar format is conducive to scientific analysis and debate. As a
practical matter, however, the costs of merging the PBOI and the regulatory process will limit the use of these boards. Although the two PBOIs
that have been convened did engage in the type of scientific inquiry that
the FDA anticipated at the hearing stage, 4°3 delays and other problems
in the pre- and post-hearing stages revealed the need to integrate the
PBOI into the normal regulatory process. 4°4 Many of these problems
can be alleviated, but PBOIs will continue to be expensive. As a result,
they will be cost-effective only in cases involving issues that call for so399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

181-82 and accompanying text.
349-50 and accompanying text.
109-12 and accompanying text.
266-74 and accompanying text.
320-21 and accompanying text.
277-78, 362-73 and accompanying text.
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phisticated scientific judgment and stimulate great public interest. In
those cases, the benefits of the PBOI-enhanced accuracy and legitimacy-are likely to outweigh the costs of the process.
Even if the use of the PBOI is limited, the process offers the FDA a
unique option with several important advantages over the agency's advisory committee system. 4°5 One key difference is that the PBOI convenes
after the agency has decided whether to license a new drug or food additive. Because the PBOI can focus on the key issues in the agency's decision, it can serve as an independent check on the validity of that decision.
Another key difference is that the PBOI emphasizes data analysis and is
more accountable than other processes for its conclusions. As a result,
the PBOI process enhances the accuracy and legitimacy of an agency's
decisionmaking. 4° 6 Furthermore, because of its timing, the PBOI can
lead to a scientific consensus on behalf of an agency's decision or a modi-

fication of it.4 07

The FDA should also consider changing the format of the PBOI.
For example, in lieu of the current PBOI, persons entitled to a hearing
could be offered the option of a "scientific seminar" hearing before the
commissioner; independent scientists would participate in the hearing.
This change would be more efficient because it would eliminate one step
in the hearing process as well as many of the administrative burdens that
have slowed the PBOI process. 4°8 At the same time, it would still allow
the FDA to obtain independent expert advice in a manner that would
increase the accuracy and legitimacy of the decisionmaking process.
B.

The PBO1 at Other Agencies.

Based on the FDA's experiences, other agencies should consider use
of the PBOI process. Like the FDA, agencies such as EPA, OSHA, and
CPSC ' consider
scientific evidence in determining whether chemicals are
"safe."' 4 9 Like the FDA, therefore, they make scientific judgments
about the validity of animal, clinical, and epidemiological evidence.
Moreover, the other agencies have the same options as the FDA for obtaining independent scientific input. Health and safety agencies can seek
scientific input through a hearing process, which is typically a form of
411
rulemaking, 4 10 or through advisory committees.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See supra notes 322-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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Other agencies could utilize the PBOI process in almost the same
fashion as the FDA. To adapt the process to rulemaking, an agency
could convene a PBOI to hear issues relevant to the rulemaking proceeding. The record of that proceeding, including the written opinion of the
board, would become part of the rulemaking record. After the PBOI
was completed, interested parties could place their responses in the rec41 2
ord to rebut or support the PBOI decision.
The PBOI offers other agencies the same advantages that the FDA
has obtained. The PBOI would be convened after the agency had published a proposed rule. Unlike an advisory committee, the PBOI could
address the specific issues raised by the proposed rule in a format that is
more productive than that of an advisory committee meeting. 41 3 Because
scientists could interact in a more "scientific" forum, the PBOI process
would also be more likely than the rulemaking process to produce a thorough analysis of the scientific issues. 414 Furthermore, the PBOI process
would legitimate decisionmaking by subjecting the proposed rule to independent scrutiny.4 15 Finally, the PBOI could lead to scientific consen4 16
sus for the agency's proposed rule or some variation of the rule.
OSHA's experience supports this view.4 17 In 1980, after a conventional rulemaking proceeding, OSHA adopted a general policy that specified the regulatory actions the agency would take if a substance was
classified as a carcinogen. 41 8 One reason it did so was to "precipitate a
full-scale public shootout ... in which all interested parties could aid the
agency in forging a policy that could serve as a model for all other government agencies. '4 19 The rule, however, "produced a cascade of opposition that was reflected not only in the [court] challenges ... but in
efforts in Congress and the executive branch ... to effect changes." 420
The rule has been withdrawn by OSHA on the ground that it was incompatable with the Supreme Court's interpretation of OSHA's powers. 42 1
412. If the agency was required to hold a hearing as part of hybrid rulemaking, see supra notes
67-81 and accompanying text, the PBOI could serve to substitute for or augment the hearing.
413. See Ashford, supra note 101, at 166.
414. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
417. See Merrill, Comment, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 105
(describing OSHA's poor experience with conventional rulemaking).
418. See Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980) (final rule).
419. McGarity, OSHA's Generic CarcinogenPolicy: Rulemaking under Scientific and Legal Uncertainty, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1, at 79.
420. Merrill, supra note 417, at 105.
421. See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1261-62.
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OSHA's unfavorable experience occurred in part because it was "attempting to define scientific parameters about which there remained wide
dispute within the scientific community at large and certainly within the
affected communities regulated by OSHA. '' 422 The agency's reliance on
traditional informal rulemaking procedures in those circumstances may
have doomed its efforts. The report for the National Center for Administrative Justice concluded:
The OSHA GCP rulemaking... was not.., a shootout of science....
"Any departures from the standard model [of traditional quasi-formal
rulemaking] tended to be in the direction of judicialization rather than
in the direction of more-informal [sic] attempts to invite the participation of scientists and facilitate the resolution of scientific issues." [No]
shootout of science-an effective consensus gathering and evaluating
of known
science-has been held and fed into the GCP rule
423
making.

The PBOI offers agencies the same advantages the FDA obtained,
and although other agencies would experience some of the same
problems as well, 424 the PBOI may actually be more useful to them than
to the FDA. Because the PBOI would not be responsible for writing a
decision to replace the initial decision of an ALJ,4 25 these other agencies
could limit the scope of the issues heard by the board to important questions of scientific judgment. As a result, the PBOI might be more costeffective in the rulemaking context for these agencies than it has been at
the FDA.
If other agencies choose not to adopt a PBOI process, the FDA's
experiences with the PBOI are still relevant. The PBOI process confirms
the advantage of obtaining expert scientific advice in a setting where
scientists can debate and act comfortably. Thus, health and safety agencies should continue to use advisory committees and should adopt the
key elements of the PBOI process for those committees. The most important of those elements is the requirement that conclusions be reported
426
in a specific and reviewable format.

422. Merrill. supra note 417, at 108.
423. Nyhart & Carrow. Toward Better Resolution of Regulatory Issues Involving Science and
Technology. in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION, supra note 1,at 290 (quoting Merrill, supra

note 417, at 106).
424. These include recruitment problems, see supra notes 277-90 and accompanying text, and
problems of delay. see supra notes 362-78 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
426. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The design of hearing procedures to resolve scientific disputes has
been a significant problem for the administrative process in the last two
decades. One fundamental change has already occurred: the hybrid
hearing has been utilized for resolving such issues. Another fundamental
change may now be on the horizon. The PBOI process differs from other
methods of obtaining scientific input in three significant ways. First, unlike advisory committees, the PBOI has decisionmaking responsibility.
Second, unlike most other hearing boards staffed by scientists, the members of the PBOI are not agency employees. Finally, the PBOI uses an
informal hearing process. These changes result from recognizing that
determining the safety of a chemical often requires difficult judgments
that are scientific as well as regulatory.
In an analysis of whether a "scientific" or "adversarial" process better resolves issues of scientific judgment, the results are mixed. The
FDA's experience does indicate that the PBOI can be the more effective
process, but at a higher price than the conventional approach. Thus, the
PBOI is unlikely to be cost-effective except when it is used to resolve
significant issues of scientific judgment.
No one should be surprised that the PBOI has not been an unqualified success. The PBOI, or any similar scientific seminar process, must
be incorporated into the normal, and adversarial, regulatory process.
Problems are bound to arise when two such different methods of decisionmaking come together.
Many lawyers remain unconvinced of the merits of the PBOI. They
object to the lack of adversarial procedures, and they believe the PBOI is
too costly. Although these concerns should be carefully considered, the
FDA's experiences seem to contradict them. The PBOI process is only
part of the regulatory process; the agency still retains the right and responsibility to make the final decisions, and the agency makes its decisions according to traditional adversarial procedures. As a result, the
PBOI process appears to be a useful compromise: it allows scientists
sufficient room to operate in an effective manner without altering the ultimate method of agency decisionmaking.
The FDA's experience with the PBOI justifies continued experimentation there and at other agencies. The potential of the PBOI has been
demonstrated, but its ultimate worth remains to be determined. Further
experimentation would create a better record for calculating costs and
benefits. At a time when health and safety agencies face ever more difficult questions of scientific judgment, the PBOI may emerge as an important improvement in the administrative process.

